The statement made by Mr. Hachiro Arita, Japanese Foreign Minister, on Monday, expressing Japan's "deep concern" with any situation that may bring about a change in the present status of the Netherlands East Indies, has, as it was expected, evoked worldwide repercussions. In some quarters it has been held to herald the possibility of Japan seeking to assume control over the Netherlands' colonies in the event of the home country being overrun by a threatened German invasion. On the other hand, it is suggested that the Japanese statement was inspired by a fear that one or other of the Allies would seek to dominate the Netherlands East Indies in somewhat the same manner as the Allies through Great Britain have extended their protection to the Faroe Islands and Iceland, following the German inroads into Denmark. The parallel which some claim to perceive between the case of Denmark and the Netherlands in the event of an onslaught upon the latter is not, however, entirely a good one. Allied control of the Faroe Islands and Iceland is necessary for strategic reasons, to make sure that neither of those places shall be used as aeroplane or submarine bases by the Germans. No such consideration applies in the case of the Netherlands East Indies, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that the war in Europe can be extended to the Far East by any action upon which Germany might embark, and certainly nothing to support the view that such a development might occur as the result of Allied action. The invasion, and possible occupation of Holland by the Germans would no more mean the disappearance of the Netherlands' Government than did the German occupation of Belgium during the last war mean the abolition of the Belgian Government, or its loss of control over its colonies. It follows, therefore, that the last thing the Allies would desire to do in the event of Germany attacking Holland would be to render it such a disservice as to seek to deprive it of its rightful possessions. The possibility of the Allies taking any step in the Netherlands East Indies likely to prejudice the rights of a country which they are willing to support against possible German aggression can be completely disregarded.
The interpretation put upon Mr. Arita's statement by the special correspondent in Tokyo of this journal is probably the correct one, namely that Japan does not at present intend to make any move with regard to the Netherlands' dependencies so long as other Powers refrain-from doing so. If, therefore, Mr. Arita's declaration is taken merely as a "hands off" warning that will probably be the correct view to adopt, though it has to be pointed out that such a warning was wholly unnecessary, in view of the fact that the last thing the Allies would desire to do would be to interfere with the rights of a nation which may be forced by German aggression to join their ranks. The Japanese statement had the result of bringing United States leaders into the field with pronouncements that any change in the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies would be "prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security....in the entire Pacific area." That coming from Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, was later reinforced by just as forthright a declaration by President Roosevelt himself. The warning was not addressed solely to Japan but to the world at large, and this insistence by the United States on the inviolability of the territories of the Netherlands East Indies ' foreshadows American action in the event of any Power or Powers seeking to take whatever advantage might accrue to them in the Pacific by reason of further German aggression in Europe. There cannot be the slightest doubt as to the legalities of the situation. In Notes exchanged between the United States and Japan as far back as 1908 each of the two governments declared their policy to be directed towards the maintenance of the status quo in the region of the Pacific. That was subsequently reaffirmed in Notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan,—as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921 relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominion in the region of the Pacific Ocean,—sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each Government declared It is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.
The obligation then entered into still exists, and the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan are definitely committed in this matter, and would be dishonouring their own signatures were any of them to take such action as that against which most of the leaders of the four Powers concerned have already uttered their warnings. There is no reason whatever why anyone should seek to interfere with the Netherlands East Indies. Those colonies occupy, and play a completely neutral role in supplying all customers with various essential commodities, which makes the economic interest of each one of them more than usually important, and which necessitates that the rights of all shall be scrupulously respected. With the Netherlands' colonies allowed to carry on their business as they have done hitherto, selling their important supplies to all customers and thus observing an economic neutrality there cannot be the slightest justification for any of the Powers proceeding in any way to alter their present status. It should not in fact be necessary in view of all that has happened, and the very definite. obligations which the four Powers have assumed, for any further arrangements to be made guaranteeing the Netherlands East Indies, but, if there is still any doubt in the matter, it should not be impossible, seeing that they are in fact all agreed upon the necessity of maintaining the status quo, for them, instead of warning each other, to issue a common declaration reaffirming their loyalty to existing commitments. Such a step would be far more constructive than the making of minatory declarations which may tend further to disturb the friendly relations which all desire to see perpetuated in the Pacific. The four Powers involved ove it to themselves to see that the European war is not extended to this part of the world, but it has been made quite plain that if there is any interference with the Netherlands, no matter by whom, the danger of such an eventuality occurring will be indeed grave. On the face of it the position can be maintained by the ordinary display of that good faith which led to the signature of the original documents, and the realization that, if the Netherlands are invaded, they will not be deprived of their Government, except in the unlikely event of the Germans winning the war.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.