The Prime Minister expressed a vigorous confidence in the strength of our defence against invasion. The Germans could get round the Maginot Line; they will have to defy the British Navy and cross at least twenty-one miles of sea before they can. begin their attack upon this island. It was, however, disappointing that Mr. Churchill seemed unwilling to modify in any way the War Office plans for the defence against invasion.
The French experience has taught us that in modern warfare there is no front line. Make a line ten miles deep, as General Weygand did on the Somme, and the result is absolute chaos when the enemy has broken through. The whole of Britain must be conceived as one single fort ress. If we wish to talk of defence in depth, then the depth of the defence must be fro: the East Coast to the West, from John o' Groats ie Land's End. This vast fort must be organized to defeat invasion, and clearly it must be divided into more serviceable commands than the four which at present exist. We doubt whether even the twelve regions of the Civil Commissioners are small enough for the purpose. Each of these new compact commands should be placed under a single military authority, whose staff should include men at present civilians büt with special qualifications, whether through their knowledge of the area or their special skill as engineers, architects, railway managers, and so on. Such men. especially they have military experience from the last war, should not be wasted as privates in the Local Defence Volunteers or permitted to vol-untoer for the Regular Army. They should be picked now for responsible posts in local defence and given a full military status alongside the professional soldier. The ing principle of home defence must be a unified control in each area, but a control not exclusively dominated by the professional soldier. The commanding officer should, of course, be a vigorous and experienced professional soldier. His staff and his other officers should be partly professional and partly drawn from responsible men in civilian life.
Under this area-military-command should fall the Air Raid Precautions, Auxiliary Fire Service, and other auxiliary services and above all the Local Defence Volunteers. At present, the Local Defence Volunteers are being organized under the County Territorial Associations, and in many areas are all too loosely associated with the military command. This is a disastrous division of authority whose ill-effects are increased by the fact that some Territorial Associations are bathed in a "county" atmosphere and dominated by the spare-time soldier who too often has joined the association no: through an interest in military science, but for social reasons. The Local Defence Volunteers can do excellent work if they become one subordinate part of a single military command and this is equally true of the A.R.P. and other kindred services.
Sir Richard Acland and others have put forward the idea of a levee en masse and a people's war. They are anxious to arm as many civilians as possible and to give to the masses the feeling that they are participating in the defence of their homes. A sound instinct has inspired this plan, but we believe that, as put forward during the last week, it is in important respects ill-conceived. Hitler's success is largely due to the fact that he has given up the use in attack on vital points of the mass army and has relied on heavily mechanized and specially trained shock troops. Against such troops, and none other are likely to be sent to this country, a civilian army with hand-grenades might well degenerate into a mob of refugees. The day when a half-armed populace could defeat absolutism on the barricades is over. Against the Nazi army nothing but a highly organized and disciplined defence can be effective.
It may be thought that the suggestions we have put forward are too obvious to be worth making. Such criticism, however, is altogether too optimistic. We believe that it will be found that not one of these obvious suggestions has been carried into effect by the War Office or the Ministry of Home Security. While Mr. Bevin and Mr. Morrison have been manfully struggling to introduce some coherence and drive into our industrial production, the Home Defence Ministries have been completely unaffected by the change of Government. They are still the, secure home of that complacent type of traditionalist who brought France to defeat. There is no evidence that they have learnt anything from the fates of General Gamelin and General Weygand. Many of them would rather be defeated according to Field Service Regulations than listen to the advice of men who know something about the Total War which has made those Regulations a bye way of ancient history. It is common knowledge that certain Tory members of the Cabinet admit that this is the case, and many soldier M-P.s are ready to give their testimony. But this is not enough. Great responsibility rests with the Labour members of the War Cabinet. If they narrow their attention to industrial problems, they are failing in their duty: the issues we have raised must have been discussed in the Secret Session; after the debate we trus isters will throw their influence behind the movement for reform. If we cannot have a Bevin at the War Office, we must at least demand that a similar spirit inspires the planning of our home defence.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.