On the diplomatic. side, M. van Kleffens discusses two important questions. Holland was scrupulous in the observance of her neutrality and refused to enter into staff talks, however informal, with any belligerent. The Foreign Minister is convinced that course was right, for Germany would have known at once of any such talks with France and Britain and would have taken them as the pretext for immediate attack. To that it might be replied that Hitl never needed a. pretext for any attack, and that plans for Allied support for Holland might have made a substantíal difference. Nothing worse could have happened to the Nethér-lands than did happen. On the other hand, immediate help could only have keen sent by air or sea, and in May, Britain and France were in no position to fly to Holland enough aeroplanes to counter the German menace.
More debatable is M. van Kleffens' rather surprising belief that Hitler's "peace speech" in October of last year after the rape of Poland was worth following up. "It still is my firm conviction," he writes, "that Herr for mechanical is also available for the militia.
You cannot, of course, make a soldier in the twinkling of an eye, but given drill, discipline and goodwill a man can be given the basis of military training which will make him look and act like a soldier in a relatively short space of time.
The militia forces are the backing for the A.LF. and should Australia ever be attacked they would become her first line of defence. Serving militia men evidently like military life, for over 20,000 have already joined the A.LF. This indeed has made it necessary for the government to ask for volunteers for the militia. And additional facilities have been given to men unable, for one reason or another, to join the AI to enlist in the militia forces, Enlistment in the ALF. is, of course, voluntary; for those enlisting may be called on to serve overseas,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.