It is now virtually certain that the Nazi army has met with its first reverse in this war. The successful withdrawals of the British from Dunkirk, Narvik, and Crete might possibly be described as reverses for the Germans, but only in the negative sense that they were thwarted in their objective. which was to destroy their enemy. ' In Soviet Higo, however, the full force of the Ger-which the Nazis believed to have been only a as been hurled against a nation
partially prepared, and though some striking gains were won through the initial tactical surprise, the "invincible" army has been stalled, its time-table shattered, and its best troops either killed, wounded, or exháusted. Successive drives have petered out. At first, it was Leningrad which was to fall like a ripe apple. Little is being heard today of the offensive on this city. Then it was Moscow which was to fall, after the capture of Smolensk. Smolensk appears still to be in Russian hands, and counter-attacks have driven the Germans further back than they were two weeks ago. tis now an offensive against the southern Ukraine. On this front the Germans have hitherto made even less progress than they have done on the other, fronts. "The Russians have all along realised the vital character of the Ukraine and the Caucasian oil fields to their national existence, and long ago concentrated their most powerful forces in that region, under He raids being made d very idi poo m lit tive opposition, by the RAF, land-minded people, these two d not appear to be decisive. It would defeat of the army—the "glorious' in held out. new offensives which will turn the trick. The capture of Moscow, say German provagandists has only been postponed; it has Dot been made impossible. Dr. Goebbels and his crew are assuring the German public that there is nothing to worry about. The Russian resistance has been unexpectedly tough, but not so tough, they say, as to do more than delay the advancing armies. But in spite of these assurances, the German public is worried. And that worry is likely to have as important an effect upon the national moral as a score of air raids would have.
Since 1933, when Hitler came into power, the German has not been allowed to think for himself. That great stimulator of thought, the question "Why?", has been systematically suppressed, because everything that happened in the Reich did so because it was the will of the Führer that it should. To ask why anything was done was io question the supreme wisdom of the Austrian paper-hanger who ruled, and was to court an invitation to a concentration camp. But with the lack of success of the German armies in Russia, with streams of wounded pouring back into. the Reich in numbers which even the Nazi High Command cannot hope to conceal, with tragic notices of death reaching so many families, it is no longer possible to control the doubts which every German felt but could not express when ihe attack on Russia was launched before Britain had been reduced as the Führer had said she would be. There is nothing so destructive to national moral as doubt. The leader, especially if he is a dictator, must inspire confidence. To do so, he must be successful. If he is not, no amount of excussing is going to put him right in the eyes of his people. Thus a crack is caused in the home front which can only be mended by victories and more victories, And if these are not forthcoming, then the crack grows wider. This is what makes it so imperative for the Nazis to defeat the Russians quickly. As a military machine the Nazi army is doubtless strong enough in itself to meet with greater reverses than those it has already suffered without seriously being weakened. But if its defeat means a crumbling of the national confidence, the seriousness of it cannot be over-emphasized.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.