From tae " Wortp."
The 1litary experts who were confident that the tables would be tumed when the war was \ransferred from the sex to the land feel themselves constrained to postpone the inevitable Russian triumph to a date which cannot at present be named aiid under conditions which cannot be precisely stated. A large experience of prospective criticism Jeads us to the conclusion that, whoever may be right, the military expert is almost invariably wrong. He usually argues from an imperfect "application of principles only half-understood to social and political conditions with which he has not had, or has neglected, the opportunity to acquaint nim-self. In the American Civil War the chivalrous South was bound to beat the shop-keeping North; in the struggle for the hegemony of Geimany the trained army of Austria was secure of victory over the Prussian levies; in thie Frunco-German struggle France was to walk over Germany; the English victory over the Boers was to be an affair of a few months, and some ten or, at most, twenty' thousand men, 'The military expert, usually argues from the last to ths next war in entire ignorance of conditions which have insensibly but' fundament tally and vitally changed. 'The mere social observer, who; has followed these changes without seeking to fit them into a preconceived system is usually better equipped for the appreciation of possibilities and pro-habilities thu the pedant of a school. We must not in'er, we were told, that because the Japanese were successful at sea, they would therefore be successful on land, But surely it might reasonably be argued that the qualities which made them successful at sea would not lose their virtue when trans: ferred to the shore; long and careful pre paration, a muster of strategy in the framers of the plan of campaign and of tactics in the commanders, " high degree of corporate discipline and of individual intelligence in soldiers and seamen—these are the instruments by which victory is won when ther ashore or float. The conspicuous lack of these qualities alike in the army and navy of Russia has defeated them before battle hus been joined. It seems to have been argued that because the Japanese won an cage victory over the Chinese ten years ago, therefore they must be defeated by the Russians in the present year of grace. Then an Asiatic Power confronted an Asiatic Power; when it stood face to face with one of the groutest military nations of Europe, matters would assume a very different aspect. We doubt the accuracy of this description. Geographically, no doubt, Russia belongs to Europe. Morally, socially, politically, and to a great degree ethnologically, Asia begins at its western frontier. In a certain sense, Russia is a European China. There is the same confusion of functions between a nominal autocracy and a corrupt bureaucracy; there is the same belief in the power of mere numbers without organise tion; in the value of resources which can not be concentrated and brought to year through the total absence or the insufficiency of means of transport and communication the same ignorant contempt of the enemy the same blind and boastful self-confidence. a record unequalled in any public service,, The Russians spoke of the semi-savages of is not far off, seems to us sufficient war- Japan much as the Chinese spoke of the Japanese dwarfs, and Russian experience in 1904 closely resembles that of China in 1895.
The comparison is instructive. Japan declared war against China on the Ist August in the year last named. Before three months had passed her troops had crossed the Yalu and in less than four months Port Arthur was captured. It is just three months and a day since the war between Russia and Japan declared itself in the disablement of the Russian Squadron Port Arthur, and already Port Arthur is invested, and the Japanese are Practically masters of the Liaotung Peninsula, and have hoisted their flag in the territory which they were iniquitously compelled, after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, nominally and for the moment to recede to China, really and for the future hand over to Russia, under pressure of her threats and the unscrupulous connivance of France and Germany. With the prudenc which she has always shown, and which is as remarkable as her warlike prowess, Japan gave way. But she waited for her opportunity, and for ten years patiently and laboriously prepared for it. Russia in Manchuria meant, as she well knew, Russia in Corea; and Russia in Corea meant the political annihilation of Japan. How effectual the preparations of Japan have been the history of the past ten days shows. In a shorter time, Russia has submitted to defeats as overwhelming, though not, we are sorry to say, as conclusive as those which China underwent ten years ago. Her fleets have been driven from the high seas; her Asiatic squadrons are, there is reason to believe, effectually bottled up in Port Arthur and Viadivostock. The long preparation has been fetlowed by a rapid execution, The Yalu was crossed on the last day of April (Saturday), and on Sunday the Russians were defeated at Kiuliénchéng in a general action, being driven from their po: tions in a mors or less disorderly flight, and losing twants-eight out of their forty guns, forty officers, and two thousand men, Whi two companies of artillery surrendered. Thorsday (6th May) the landing of Japane: troops on the east side of the Liaotung Peninsula began, and it was followed by the disembarkation' of a second Japanese Army nearer Port Arthur, which is now completely cut off, Admiral Alexeieff and the Arch duke Boris escaping just in time. The Japanese now hold the railway from Port Arthur to Mukden at Port Adams, where they have cut it and broken down a bridge. They ars, in practice, masters of the peninsula, Their victory was no doubt aided by the negligence of the enemy, who lost many opportunities of annoying them, and by the unskilful strategy and tactics of General Kuropatkin, in whom it seems probablo that Russia has found a military Admiral Alexeieff. For the moment a scape-out seems to have been found in General Sassuliteh. The Russian reply to disabling blows is at present confined to evasive ox-cusses, and to boastful and threatening words. She will do something terrible somewhere or other and at some time or other. Even friendly critics describe the position of affairs as disastrous. The authority of Russia is shaken both in Europe and Asia; and the value of her alliance and the danger of her hostility are being openly questioned. Domestic disaffection may see its opportunity in military and foreign embarrassment. But whatever the ultimate issue of the contest, it is not likely that the Great Powers, which have interests in the Pacific as great as those of Russia, will suffer the state of things out of which the war has arisen to be renewed. President, Roosevelt has declared, somewhat prematurely, that the Pacific belongs to the United States; and this is but the extravagant utterance of a growing sentiment which will certainly contest Russian predominance there. England is of the same mind, as her treaty with Japan shows. It is not impossible to coerce even a victorious Russia into moderation, as the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for the Treaty of San Stefano showed; and a victorious Russia has still to. be waited for.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.