The future historian of Weihai Bri ish ion—assuming that the lease of the Dependency will be renewed—will find that txak is a melancholy one as regards the first seven years. The record to the self-respecting Engli.
be humiliating ail painful reading. Bri ish diplomacy having failed to prevent
and Port Arthur by jis, we leased the acquisition of Tai ngiao by Germany, Weilmiwei to prevent loss of prestige. With our usual good fortune (the ultra-patriot, who considers the Anglo-Saxon race in specially favoured of Providence, would hi no difficulty in finding a reason) we obtained the best of the three larbours. The Germans at an enormous cost have had practically to make their harbour, and the climate is not so favourable as that of the more northern port. It is well known that the Russians found the anchorage at Port Arthur altogether too small for the use of large ships. Weihaiwei is well favoured by nature, and provides excellent shelter snd all the Mooommodation that in ever likely to be peeded by the Briish fleet in the East, The climate, too, is generally admitted to be the most favourable on the China coast,—an important consideration in the case of ships that frequently come here with long sick lists from bot and unhealthy places to the south.
But Weihaiwei is in-Shantung, and Germany regarded that province as special "sphere of influence." To avoid hurting German susceptibilities the British Government undertook.not to connect their new possession with other parts of the province by building railways! The place was to be a naval base pure and simple. No competition with German trade would be allowed. All this, of course, on the understanding that Germany would recognise England' special interests and rights in the Yangtze Valley. We became so friendly with our good friends the Germans that we concluded a treaty with them with the object of preserving the integrity of China and protecting the " open door" principle. as regards the trading interests of all nations. This treaty was subsequently interpreted by British Government as applying to Manchuria, but the German Chancellor thought otherwise, and, no doubt, when the time and occasion proved convenient it would have been found to exclude Shantung. In fact, with a truly fine cynicism the Chancellor publicly dec' ared that the treaty, from the point of view of the German Government, had better be known as the " Yangtze Agreement "—iv other words, it was a blow aimed at British claims and interests, and, to quote sporting phrase, it was a blow below and dis'rust—almos; amounting to positive animosity—amongat all classes of Englishmen The natural outcome, the logical sequence of the failure of this convention joint declaration concerning th ests in the East by way of counter-blast, but I venture to state that no one was more surprised, disappointed, gusted at this development aforesaid Chancellor and his imperial master. _Sinco Russia's special claims as regards Manchoria fally challenged by Japan, it would not be surprising if Germany now found it necessary to moderate her demands and the general tone of her policy as regards Shantung. We may safely predict, too, that in the present temper of the Britis people, assuming they retain possession of Weihsiwei, German protest against commercial development of the colony will be ignored.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.