Yesterday morning the writer ambled about the Quarter absorbing opinion and called upon several Chinese who are supposed to be in touch with the Japanese and found. that those competent to guess had arrived at almost identical inter-Dretations of Japanese movements and publicity.
These conclusions were somewhat as follows: Japan sees the northern forces retiring upon Tientsin and Peking and believes that the northern morale is breaking down, that the Fengtien soldiers, once homeward bound, will put up a feeble resistance "against the various Nationalist Leaders and—that, Sooner or later, Chang Tso-lin and his whole company will withdraw and leave this territory to a group of mutually jealous commanders with little control over their Subordinates and with patchwork: armies accustomed to deal high-Handedly with foreigners and saturated with Communism. Such prospect promises no security for foreign life, property or investments, no betterment of the condition of the Chinese people and no permanent peace. Tt brings chaos, confusion And anti-foreignism so much nearer! to Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin is not} cing to be able to hold thir tide of trouble in check for any great! length of time, think the Japanese, therefore putting aside the enti: mental regard for the professional trouble-maker's sovereign right to ruin his country, which has already cost China and the Powers that have commerical relations with her so dearly, there is no reason why Japan should not anticipate trouble while she is in the field and establish such Precautionary forces in Peking and Tientsin as will inspire, in the the] various hordes that are converging upon the capital, that regard for common decency which their leaders} have failed to instil into them.
To warrant such a precautionary step in defiance of the conventions of the past few years, Japan has had to impress upon her own people and the world Chang Tso-lin's inability to hold out and the imminence of the danger of a southern occupation. This explains the dismal propaganda. The sooner} Chang Tso-lin goes the sooner can the precautionary measures be taken and the more thorough-going can theytbe made. It is embarrassing to try to establish efficient military defences in the seat of a friendly administration even when cireum= Sel stances warrant extraordinary steps, A Notice to Quit The majority of the speculators in the Quarter had arrived as such conclusions as those given before noon yesterday, and then, when it became Known that Japan was on the point of presenting a note to} the northern and southern leaders, announcing her intention to bar the way to civil war in Manchuria and making several pointed references to the safety of foreigners in Ticntsin and Peking, all observers were confirmed in their previous interpretation of Japan's attitude. The note looked very much like a notice to Chang Tso-lin to get back to Manchuria and keep order there and to leave the Japanese to welcome the unresisted southerners or Kuomin chun in Peking and Tientsin and guarantee these communities against the customary Nationalist effervescence. It was generally con-lectured also that the more territory the Nationalists equid claim to control when Japa was ready to impose her terms the more widely ap-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.