The Archive · 1920

The Shantung Notes

June 19, Tue long statement issued in Tokio on June 10 and appearing in our telegrams yesterday, relative to the discussions between China and Japan, is to be welcomed if only because it puts the public in possession of all that has occurred. Immediately after the Treaty of Peace, under which "the German rights and interests in Shantung passed into the possession of Japan," became effective, that is to say last January, the Japanese Government requested the Chinese Government to open nego' ions ''relative to the restoration of Kiaochou to China and the settlement of details incidental thereto.' ~At the same time it signified its intention of withdrawing the Japanese guards from the railway as soon as China had police ready to take their place. This, in passing, Japan still adheres to her intention of doing). No reply having been received, Japan again pressed for negotiations on April 26; and on May 22 China replied that she could not negotiate, partly because she had not signed the Treaty with Germany, partly because the temper of the Chinese people would not permit of negotiation. To this Japan replies that as China had assented to the German rights passing to herself long before the Treaty was signed (this was one of the famous Twenty-one Demands) it does not "appear to matter when ther China signed that Treaty or not, She says that she remains ready to negotiate whenever China wishes to do so, and hopes that the latter will not hesitate to give her, Japan, an opportunity "to demonstrate by concrete actions a policy of fairness and justice towards China."

The tone of the note is certainly to be described as-conciliatory. It may, therefore, seem churlish to point out that it is easy for Japan, as the beatus possidens, in full enjoyment of everything that is worth having in Kiaochou, to make pretty speeches.

Conciliation, under such conditions, is more likely to rasp than mollify the aggrieved feelings of the other party; and it cannot fail to be observed that if Japan really desires "to demonstrate by concrete actions a policy of fairness and justice towards China,"' there is not the slightest need for her to await the opening of any negotiations, which indeed, in the circumstances, could not fail to remind every onlooker of the ''negotiations,"' in A8sop's fable, between the wolf and the lamb. China's contention that she cannot negotiate because she did not sign the Treaty with Germany appears perfectly valid. She refused to sign, notwithstanding the difficulty of the position in which such abstention would obviously place her, because she could not and would not agree to the wholesale assignment to Japan of the German rights in Shantung. To say that she had already agreed in 1915 is technically correct, but morally valueless as an argument, inasmuch as there is no earthly doubt that China only acceded to the Twenty-one Demands because she could not help herself, and that those demands were only presented and wrung from her because the West was so deeply engaged in the war that it had no time to spare for the East. If China had not presented her case at Versailles so badly, making all sorts of demands which a little reflexion would have shown her that the Powers had no time to consider, these facts would have received proper recognition and the Shantung clause would never have got into the Peace Treaty. In her predicament, China took the only course open to her in refusing to sign the Treaty. And if to-day Japan reminds her of the Twenty-one Demands, she can with far greater justice remind Japan that; when she declared war on Germany, she did so partly, in her own words, to restore Kiaochou to China.

But to leave the question at this point is to allow an impossible position to drag on indefinitely, and to perpetuate a cause of bitter feeling and friction between the two countries.

Moreover, other nations are interested in its settlement. At the annual meeting of the British Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, held on March 26 last, it was indicated very plainly that Japanese occupation of Tsingtao meant the virtual exclusion of everybody else, foreigners as well as Chinese. That is no more than the common experience of all who have and do business in Tsingtao, nor is it even impossible to point to instances in which the Japanese authorities have deliberately tried to oust British firm from property which it was intended to include in the Japanese reservation, The Chairman of the British Chamber, in the speech referred to, -outlined the form of constitution which appears most desirable to apply in Kiaochou, and he further indicated that the Chamber would leave no stone unturned to secure such an arrangement. But it is difficult to expect any outside Power to intervene in the controversy until invited to do so by China. The Japanese Note leaves China to take the next step and the only possible one apparent for her is to appeal the whole issue to the League of Nations. That body, it has been well point. ed out, is entirely different to the Conference of Versailles. It is not bound as the Conference. was by any private undertaking given during the war. Moreover its adjudication would give an opportunity to Japanese liberalism to assert its influence. For Japan's policy in Tsingtao is still; as it has ever been, dictated by the military faction, and there is no lack of men of broader vision in Japan who are anxious for a fair settlement with China and to extricate their country from the false position to which the militarists have nailed her.'

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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