Dec. 8.
The further statement of Peking's policy in dealing with the agents of the USSR. in China, from our Peking correspondent, which we published yesterday filled conspicuous gaps in the earlier report of Fengtien's attitude towards Red Russia in a fashion which is not too encouraging. Piecing the two reports together, we -now' know that Chang Tsodin and his followers consider that, since the Embassy is no longer used as the supreme directorate of Red subversion and crime in China, the Shanghai Consulate-General is probably the major Suviet base in this country and therefore the storm centre. It is also made clear that the Peking administration would not} only like to see this breech place of infinite trouble clos its dependents, the Chinese Communists, and its "workers" expelled from territory under foreign jurisdiction so that the local authorities could deal with them by purely Chinese methods, In the earlier report it was also emphasized that Peking could not understand why the Munfcipal authorities did not take action against the Red Consulate, thereby contributing a little something to the campaign which Chang Tso-lin has hitherto had tu conduct single handed, All of this should give us no} little moral support in our demand for the Consulate's removal, but the inquiry which we made editorially a few da agu into Chang Tso-lin's reasons for allowing Comrade Koslovsky and other agents to retain their exequatur, originally received from Peking, is now answered in terms which are somewhat depressing. The withdrawal of consular exequaturs would be equivalent to a complete breach of relations with Soviet Russia and, with neither material nor moral support of the anti-Bolshevist Powers behind Chang Tso-lin or any other Chinese leader who now opposes Red machinations, Russia might be moved by such a complete breach to take action which Chang Tso-lin, with all his domestic troubles, could not face unless he had the pledged support of the Powers. We learn also that the Legations are unable te promise him anything, much as they would like to see action taken here, so that it very unlikely that the Generalissimo will withdraw Comrade Koslovsky's exequatur and give notice of it to the Municipal authorities on his own initiative, For this we can scarely blame him. We can see his point of view. But, at the same time, we are convinced that he exaggerates the possible dangers that might follow a breach of relations. Soviet Russia has tov much trouble at home and is too ill-prepared to fight anyone to challenge the unfriendly Powers by anything like military, encroachment upon China. We are convinced that Japan alone would stifiy resist any attempt at actual physical intrusion upon Manchuria, Chibli, or adjacent parts of Inner Mongolia, The
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.