The Archive · 1937

ITALY'S DOUBTS

It is permissible to be sceptical of Germany's, enthusiasm for the line of policy which Italy seems to be adopting in the Mediterranean. For some time past Herr Hitler's Government has been convinced of the unwisdom of making Spain the battle-ground between Communism and Fascism, Germany has not been unfriendly to the measures which France and Great Britain have taken to suppress: submarine piracy in the Mediterranean and Italy's eventual ce-operation in that scheme has probably come is a relief to her fellow-partner in the Rome-Berlin axis. Nine powers signed the Nyon anti-piracy agree ment, discussion of which was severely kept to technicalities, The resultant plan imposed on two of those powers—France and Great Britain—the obligation to take positive action, the remaining seven Mediterranean countries giving such support as might be comprised by the offer of harbour facilities to the anti-piratical navies. Italy by agreeing to participate in the patrol scheme, with certain reservations, indicated her readiness to cooperate in practical collective action. The claims made by Signor Benito Mussolini at Berlin as a convinced adherent to a policy of peace held out hopes that a further realignment of his country on the side of European stability would gradually develop. On that account the proposal for a tripartite con~ ference to discuss the issue of the withdrawal of volunteers appeared to have attractive possibilities, Although it has been evident that volunteers from more than one European country have been active in Spain, Italy's has been the only Government which has openly, if equivocally, recognized the presence there of military, naval and aerial forces sent there by express official direction, If therefore the Spanish Government were willing to dispense with all foreign volunteers it was felt that Italian agreement for the withdrawal of Italian units from General Franco's troops would greatly clarify the position. "Whatever charges may be brought against the Russian Soviet Government it will be recognized that it tactfully considered Italy's susceptibilities when, like Germany, it waived the right to attend the anti-piratical conference at Nyon. It Is generally assumed that Russian acquiescence in the withdrawal of volunteers follows automatically from the Spanish Government's} announcement, Italy's refusal to discuss the matter except through the unwieldy and so] far ineffective Non-Intervention Committee is} therefore dim cult to justify on purely practical grounds.

If Italian assurances regarding the maintenance of the status quo in Spain and the Western Mediterranean have reality there should be no reluctance to discuss with France and Great Britain, as the two powers mainly concerned in that issue, the measures which are essential to the endowment of Spain with the capacity for settling her own internal} affairs. It is true that the refusal to participate In the tripartite conference reiterates allan agreement with the principle of nonintervention, but when Signor Mussolini declares that Italy is determined at all costs] to prevent the Bolshevization of Spain, he is obviously hedging that agreement about with what might easily be frustrative reservations. Whether the present Government of Spain is] Communist, Anarchist or Bolshevist matters Aittle; controversy on that point might prove to be interminable, The fact remains that for Signor Mussolini's rhetorical purposes, important as they are in the scheme of the state! folalitarian, any form of Government which happens not to suit Fascism's book would acquire the disability conveniently given the red label, Therefore the Italian Note, admir~ ably phrased and sweetly reasonable as its text appears to be, Is tantamount to a direct refusal, especially as reference of the issue to the Non-Intervention Committee would merely prolong the agony of dissension. Great Britain Is wisely reluctant to abandon hope and is prepared apparently to meet Italian wishes by summoning a special meeting of the] Non-Intervention Committee for the purpose of] testing the validity of Italy's contentions. thus refraining from any action which might} be interpreted provocative, Great Britain is once again underlining her desire to maintain peaceful bases of discussion, Whether Germany would thank anyone for dragging her into the negotiations at this stage is open to]

doubt, but perhaps even there France and Great' Britain might be prepared to Mahan views. The situation is plainly hi ing with anxieties but it would be rash (0 give ita more portentous description. Signor 'Mussolini is reported to be calling up certain categories of the army to the colours. It is move which a dictator can make without necessarily' arousing apprehensions such as would accrue from a decision of the same kind in a democratic country. Sometimes initative seems in diplomatic crises to be specially the prerogative of the dictatorial regime.. It is seldom endowed with precision and is lable to the influence of sudden va~ aries comparable with those which inspired it.

to be feared that Italy's attitude is born of an excessive reliance on the doctrine of prestige—a prestige concerned with the maintenance of various conflicting commitments to which Signor Mussolini considers pledged, It is all very well to cite!

jan declarations condemning intervention in Spain but when they are compared with easily established actions the process becomes.

a little bewildering. Italy in the latest Note

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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