Mr. Kenji Kodama's assurances that the Central China Development Company will not be a threat to the vested rights and interests of third Powers will be received with relief and interest by the business men of those third Powers now in Shanghai. The reservation must be made, however, that the third Powers themselves are probably the best judges of what may detrimentally affect their interests, and that they await the implementation of Mr. Kodama's assurances with considerable uneasiness. The seven subsidiary companies of the North China Development Company cover the widest possible field, and their monopolistic character has already been shown in the limited activities they have so far been engaged upon. These subsidiaries are the Central China Iron Mining Ca, the Central China Water and Power Ca, the Shanghai Inland River Steamship Ca., the Central China Telecommunications Ca, the Shanghai Real Estate Ca, the Central China Urban Motor Transport Ca, and the Central China Fisheries Ca. The last-named company is operating in no way differently from the former Chinese fish monopoly, except that it is now a Sino-Japanese monopoly. Foreign interests are not directly affected by it, and therefore it is only its character which is looked upon with some doubt. If the other companies are to be equally monopolistic, then more than Mr. Kodama's assurances will be needed to sweeten the bitter pill. What has been done by the Shanghai Inland Steamship Ca. is also far from cheering. The Soochow Creek, for example, is as fast closed to foreigners as is the Yangtze above the Kiangyin boom, to the great inconvenience of those firms which formerly relied upon creek transport for the raw materials of the factories in western Shanghai, The closure of this creek is not susceptible of the same explanations as have been given for the closure of the Yangtze to all but Japanese traders. There are no mines, no guerillas—at least in the immediate neighbourhood—and no military operations which might be impeded. The only boom which once blocked the creek was laid by the foreign defence forces, to prevent Chinese from making the creek inside the Settlement boundaries a scene of battle. And, incidentally, this boom acted as some sort of protection to the rear of the Japanese defences here. Yet foreign traffic on the creek is for-hidden, Protecting Panama Canal Of all the world's waterways none is more valuable or important than the 50-mile Panama Canal which bisects the American Continent at the Isthmus of Panama and links the Atlantic with the Pacific. It is able to accommodate the world's largest ships with the exception of the Queen Mary and the Normandie, and last year 28,100,000 tons of shipping passed through it, nearly equalling the highest total of the Suez Canal. Saving of time is tremendous for in seven or eight hours thousands of miles of distance can be sliced off a voyage which would last weeks more if it were made around Cape Horn, the alternative to the Canal route, To the United States its strategic importance is inestimable in a changing political map which has made the Atlantic as vital a sphere of American defence interest as the Pacific, traditionally America's main concern for it enables the swift transfer of naval units from one coast to another to meet any threat. Once this link is severed and passage blocked, the American fleet loses much of its power through virtual immobility or restricted operational ability. Therefore, when Mr. Harry A. Woodring, the U.S. Secretary for War, impresses the necessity for making the Panama Canal impregnable against attack or sabotage and safeguarding this vital artery of communications he is stressing what appears to be obvious. To the traveller passing through the Canal, one of the greatest pieces of engineering ever accomplished it always strikes him, without any profound examination, how easy it would be for an enemy nation to pass a steamer through the Canal and then blow it up either in the intricate system of locks or in one of the cuts where ordinary landslides have demonstrated the possibilities of obstruction. There may be feasible reasons of an unexplained technical or defensive character which confoünd this apparent simplicity of attack, but on the face of the situation there does not appear to be any great difüculties in achieving this object. Once the lock system has gone the American fleet is paralyzed by a form of sabotage which would not operate so effectively in the Suez Canal, which is merely a long ditch through the desert and, in any case, represents a saving in time and distance to only certain types of vessels. Others can travel via the Cape of Good Hope quite conveniently and the largest ships are compelled to take this route in any case. Although Mr. Woodring looks to President Roosevelt's "continental solidarity" Policy in the broader aspect of defence, in drawing attention to the Panama Canal needs which include stronger defences, elimination of sabotage possibilities and the rendering of the locks and dams bomb-proof he has put his finger on a problem of immediate concern and correction for the United States. The chain is as strong as its weakest link. Mr. Woodring appears to think he has discovered that link.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.