Comparison of the public utterances of Japanese statesmen regarding the Sino-Japanese hostilities made nearly a year ago with those recently made in Tokyo by Lieut Gen. Seishiro Itagaki, Minister of War, indicates a very considerable change of opinion as to how long this undeclared war is likely to continue. Like the struggle iñ Spain which was to have been, according to the insurgents, a matter of a few days, it was confidently expected in Japan that the campaign in China would not be unduly long. For example on August 24 General Sugiyama, Gen Itagaki's predecessor, declared he could not foresee how long the Sino-Japanese conflict would last, but emphasized that Japan intended to bring hostilities to an end as speedily as possible by taking the military initiative instead of continuing her past policy of replying to Chinese attacks, "Japan," he added, "would not wage a protracted war against China and thus play into China's hands." That undoubtedly meant that General Sugiyama contemplated a short, and successful victory in China. That was the view held by Prince Konoye, the Premier, on September 6, when addressing the Diet. "The Government" he said "wants to deal speedily a fatal blow to the Chinese troops." He declared that the military were confident of being able to achieve this aim. Four days later the enthusiasm of Gen. Sugiyama had undergone some modification for on September 10 he is reported as having declared to Domei "Although the results achieved by the Japanese forces in both North China and the Shanghai area are fully up to expectations, Japan should redouble her efforts to bring about an early termination of the current conflict" On the same day Prince Konoye d the view to assembled newspaper-the host would extend into 1938. What brought about that change of opinion was undoubtedly the stubborn resistance which the Chinese were offering the Japanese forces around Shanghai, and the general situation which did not augur well for any rapid fulfilment of the Japanese plans, Following the fall of Shanghai the capture of Nanking was rapid, but the programme had already been delayed considerably. The long time taken to reduce Hsuchow added further to the dislocation of original hopes, while there is some indication that the capture of Hankow will not be achieved with that speed which those who clamoured for an advance on that city evidently anticipated. General Chiang Kai-shek having announced his intention of continuing the struggle even after that, General Itagaki is now reported to have said that "Japan is prepared to carry on hostilities for ten years if they should last so long." So belief in the speedy defeat of China changed into the idea that the hostilities would last into this year, and now the War Minister contemplates the possibility of the war lasting for ten years. The general tenor of the War Minister's speech was one of confidence that the Japanese army and nation were fully competent to carry on hostilities to the bitter end, but he concluded his remarks with the significant passage "After all the nation should be armed with the firm determination bravely to face protracted hostilities, and be prepared for them so that the incident may be brought to an end as early as possible." When the caution with which statesmen have to prepare their speeches is taken into consideration, and the very definite limits to which they may go, it is quite apparent that Gen. Itagaki was seeking to prepare the country for the blow that general realization of the fact that fighting may go en indefinitely must necessarily inflict.
This can safely be said; on the face of things Japan has been drawn deeper and deeper into those toils in which she is playing the very game which General Sugiyama said the country would not play. She is being obliged to fight a protracted war, the game which the Chinese Government wanted her to play.
That has been brought about by the stoutness h which the Chinese armies, badly equipped as compared with their enemies, have fought the Japanese inch by inch in north China and along the Yangtze Valley, and there is little or nothing at present to suggest that events will assume a quicker tempo.
If Japan were forced to fight a ten-year war she would emerge from it, whether victorious or not, with fortunes so impaired that for a long time to come she would ¿mount to little more than a second-class Power. The enormous cost of such a war would prove an insuperable burden for a nation which already carries a sufficiently heavy load. It is by no means easy to ascertain what this struggle has cost the Japanese in money up to the present, but that is not the whole of the price. Heavy as has been the actual cost of the prosecution of hostilities, Japan is paying the price in other directions as well, such as the loss of revenue from diminished trading and the artificial restrictions imposed upon her exchange and industries. If the actual cost of fighting is taken to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of Yen 7,000,000,000 and it cannot be very far from that figure, it is clear that only a comparatively few years would exhaust the Yen 50,000,000,000, which a former Finance Minister said Japan could afford to spend on a war. Mr. Masayuki Tani, Japanese Minister-at-large, yesterday in Tokyo spoke of the diplomatic corps in China being surprised at the speedy progress of Japanese operations up the Yangtze and the fall of Anking. They may have been quick, but up to the present nothing has occurred which in any way compensates for the delay in the Japanese programme which has become all too apparent. There'seems to be very little doubt that the Japanese will continue to progress into the interior of China, for humanly speaking it is difficult to see how the Chinese can ever expect to beat them on the field, but, time being here the essence of the contract, the longer the Japanese forces take about it the costlier will it be for them, That has been the design of Chiang Kai-shek all along. His ideas of how long the Japanese could be held up may not entirely have been realized, but, even if they have been met only partly, much of the damage he expected will have been done to the Japanese. Gen. Itagaki's remarks, therefore, must make dismal reading for those Japanese who originally expected a short period of hostilities to be followed by. a splendid harvest in the shape of a subdued and humble China. And they will probably realize that, should Japan be obliged to continue this struggle too long, there will be no fruits of victory but rather the bitter crop of frustration.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.