Feb, 8.
General Yang Hu-chéhg and the former North-Eastern troops. will probably be strengthened in their Seelsion to renew allegiance to Nanking by the recent evidence of the Red armies' unreliability. There is tittle to show that. the Communist leaders can effectively make' their proposed change of policy compatible with ce-opera~ ion "inthe programme of the Central Government. On their ber! halt it has been alleged that they would be willing to hand over their troops to the authority of Nanking! and {o accept the. Kuomintang creed as a satisfactory cover for the economic reforms which they con sider to be essential to the welfare of the rural masses. It is true that, Since the Sian episode, the Govern= ment has apparently made no precise effort to test the verity of this Communist proposal. Regrets are felt in some quarters that some such Interchange of views has not been sought. The.pessibiuity. that] an Important section of the Reds are genuinely desirous of coming to a, alld compromise cannot be Ignored. At the same. time, the persistent! argument that a positive challenge! should be issued fo Japan must vitiate the contention: that economic reform is the main consideration of the Communists, Special emphasis given to these doubts when the overt acts of the Reds imply] hostility to the Central Government of more Immediate concern than Aamboyant—but perfectly sate—flourishes of verbal defiance Japan. No-one who studies the Far! Bastorn situation generally can be otherwise than convinced that the!
Fane encouragement of friendly tations between China and Japan on the basis of an economic co-opera tion as defined by Shou Ching-wei of the Central Banke of China is the best course for the Chinese Government (0 approve. Recent Aeelarations at Tokyo have done! nothing to refute the suggestion that Mr, Shou Ching-wo's stipulation for equality and reciprocity in de~ velopment of such ce-operation, will be palatable to Japanese statesmen. Moreover if the Communist insislenee on the need for economic reform is seriously accepted by the Government at Nanking it is pertinent to point out that attention to that urgent problem cannot be properly given if, at the same time, 1 policy designed to provoke mili tary conflict with Japan has to be putin the forefront of national The situation of the Central Government is at-the moment affected the exigencies of political dlivagations which necessarily ase sume undue importance owing. to the forthcoming Plenary. Session, Major policies recede into the background as discussions tend to rage Found. personalities. This, isthe natural state of any Government in a similar plight. Yet when the Plenary Sessfon has had its say and the Government has adjusted itself to the composure of present differences of opinion, the questions which ultimately determine _the destiny of the country must renew their insistent claims on public attention. Sian has showa that the' progress which fas been maintained consolidating national unity and bringing the: Government into real association with the. bulk of the people is by far the most important problem to-day. The test of the Government's national appeal is not primarily found in its relations with Japan_but rather in its contacts! with China. This view 1s plainly held by responsible men within and without the Kuomintang. General Chiang Kal-shek's reorganization of the Army and his efforts to put national defence on a firm basis cannot have a permanent authority' unless his programme of economic reconstruction is tackled and given the due weight of unremitting and practical devotion. Discussions of the actual changes proposed in the personnel of the Administration Teave the public cold except in so far as they do or do not guarantee alert activity in responding to the economic needs of the country. Time passes; a far-reaching scheme of monetary and currency reform is nearly eighteen months old. Dr.
Kung has courageously pressed it on the Government's Wer tention undeterred by obstruction, one misrepresentation and disappoint-ite ments.. He"has still to attain the durn major objectives by which, as he! made clear when his scheme was announced, he hopes to establish his. reconstruction on a lasting founda~ tion. His main diMeulty, it seems, Is to induce the Government as a whole: to realize that these objectives are vital and that any faltering in the advance will 50} seriously "impair the position already established that economic relapse, inimical to the welfare of the country, as a whole might be precipitated and so set up a general deterioration externally and internally.
The Government has commanded and still "commands considerable sympathy in the immensity of its task. So obvious Is the need for reform, so much requires to be done the provision of elementary' machinery for the mere purpose of assessing the significance of econ-amic conditions, that it is dim-cult to avoid the errors of haste, superificiality and immaturity. The desperate efforts to keep the fabric intact as the measures of reconstruction are devised -and applied must necessarily perpetuate weaknesses which in themselves constitute serious problems for the reformer.. The greatest asset for any Government in China is the character of the people; the} patience, commonsense and endurance' of the agricultural classes ought not to encourage dilatoriness but should stimulate a steady and] unswerving attention to the main factors of the problem. There is the less excuse for indulging. in facile catchwords or applying. spectacular panaceas. The people are resourceful enough to respond. to leadership which appeals to the doctrine of self-help. They cannot be expected properly to play their part in reconstruction unless they can perceive a conerete link be-' tween their own requirements and]
1 Government's policy. Under-fanding of the economic principles affecting their livelihood is an essential to any programme of reform. The pronouncements of General Chiang Kai-shek raised hopes which it is the Government's concern to see are not disappointed. Valuable efforts have been made by' various official and unofficial organizations to improve communications, to develop rural rehabilitation." The currency reforms have done much. The removal of crushing burden of taxation comprised in the inequalities of! land-charges: and surtaxes deserves most careful attention, In the! event the Government may be pressed to lay the foundations of radical administrative reorganiza~ tion and an adequate survey of land and of ownership, kept up to date' by registration of sales." If steps could be initiated to show that this far-reaching reform was seriously contemplated the Government might feel closer in touch' with-the realities of China's problems. A more sefentiqe connection of the Central with the provincial finances would be of great assistance in bringing some policy of that kind into actual: shape. The politician can perceive the importance of currency reform, of industrial development, and of other - expedients which' readily' meet with outside approval and recognition: It ig not so eisy_to convince him that those advances: cannot be sustained unless the fundamental issues of Iand tenure and the livelihood of the agricul-furalist are brought within the purview of practical policy. National resentment may be fitfully roused against so-called "foreign aggression." As-a rallying cry.that} appeal is unstable and unsatisfying, when: once emotional periods have passed. The programme designed
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.