Oct. 6.
The speeches made in Parliament following Mr, Neville Chamberlain's exposition of what had been happening in connection with Czechoslovakia have up to the present made no particularly valuable contribution to the consideration of a very vexed subject. Mr. Cc. R. Attlee, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and Mr. Anthony Eden, as well as Mr. Duff-Cooper have followed lines either of party politics, as would necessarily be the case of the first) two politicians, or have done just what was to be expected of the last two having in view their opinions with regard to Germany's foreign policy. On the face of the exchanges Mr. Chamberlain has undoubtedly obtained the better of the argument, and it will be surprising if-as a result of the debate on the Government motion, which commenced yesterday the Government receives anything in the nature of a substantial buff at the hands of the. House of Commons. It is, however, clear that a by no means inconsiderable proportion of the members supporting the Government is by no means completely at ease over the implications of Mr. Chamberlain's policy as it has now developed, and while it is unlikely that many of them will vote against the Government, it is apparent that there are by no"means few who are awaiting further developments before whole-heartedly committing themselves to future support of the Prime Minister. The French ministerial declaration on the same subject which appears in another: column, however, adds considerably to the available information on the developments of last week. It will be remembered that Mr. Eden in his speech remarked that during his term of office as Foreign Secretary he iliad advised the Czechoslovak Government to settle the Sudeten question as soon as possible, an admission which clearly proves that Prague was, quite a long time ago well advised of the British Government's attitude jin the matter. The French declaration shows that towards the beginning of last month parallel action by both France and Great Britain advised Czechoslovakia to make just and rapid concessions, but that harmony was never established between the broadening Czech proposals on the one hand and the ever-increasing Sudeten claims on the other. There were then the Nuremberg) speeches which made it appea¥ that war was Inevitable.
ts just here that the French declaration of supreme importance for it states that! on the night of September 13, M. Daladier, the French Prime Minister, suggested to Mr. Chamberlain that direct meetings should be held between the responsible leaders, and Mr. Chamberlain being of the same opinion left for the Berchtesgaden interview. It is most significant fact that not only did Mr. Chamberlain move with the foreknowledge jand consent of the French Government, but that this was a development arising out of 8 suggestion made by M. Daladier himself. That disposes once and for all of any suggestion that Mr. Chamberlain was in any, way forcing the French Government's hand by taking the step which he did, and proves conclusively that the apparent unity of the two governments during the crisis was a thing of very real substance. The French [suggestion and' the manner in which it wax ferried out marked a new development. in Jsiplomacy, startling because of the manner ju which it became revealed, but neverthe-ess one of the most significant importance, fond a logical outcome of. recent developments in Europe. Democracies, hampered by written and unwritten constitutions, pre~ jeedents and all the other encumbrances which have accumulated during their his~ tory, are at a decided disadvantage when dealing with the heads of totalitarian states. The power of Herr Hitler and Signor Musso-Jini is absolute, They and they alone make {the final decisions regarding policy, domestic Jor foreign, and are able to conduct negotia~ tions without that continual reference back Cabinets, which was to be noted after the Berchtesgaden talks and Mr. Chamberlain's return to Condon. Obviously Mr. Chamber-Jain felt: tat disadvantage, and when the again met Herr Hitler at' Godesberg it is apparent that he was doing the utmost he could, subject to the limitations hampering Fim, to meet Der Fuehrer on his own around, Consequently at Godesberg and Munich Mr, Chamberlain adopted a position as similar as possible to that of Herr Hitler, tone in which he also would have to make swift decisions, trusting in their subsequent endorsement by his Cabinet and ultimately by Parliament, At Munich the four heads of the Great Powers had to make their decl~ sions across the table. Their yea had to be yea, and their nay nay, for there was no longer time for further consultations in Paris or London.
Whether the average Briton or Frenchman approves or disapproves of this development, it has now been made quite clear that in dealing with the heads of states who dictate their own policies, democratic statesmen will require a much greater latitude than they have ever had before, that decisions for good or 51 will have to be made on the spot, and with unaccustomed rapidity at that, The realiza~ tion of that fact by M. Daladier and Mr. (Chamberlain was undoubtedly the factor which changed the apparent trend of events, and it speaks well for both of them that they were able to adapt their procedure to the realities of a particularly serious situation. It must be admitted that the carrying on of diplomatic negotiations along such lines is necessarily accompanied by a large degree of anger, but, conditions being as they are in Europe, this is a risk which will have to be faced, "The meeting of the heads of States for the discussion of questions outstanding between them has much to commend it, Even if it only leads to a better understanding of the other government's point of view it should prove valuable, and, when all is said and done, it involves no' different principle than that by which a nation entrusts its fortun time of war to its commander-in-chief in the field. It means that statesmen will in the future be called upon to make their own decisions within the lines of policy generally, accepted: by their supporters, but probably without reference to them, and the danger fs that at some time or' other statesmen will return from such meetings pledged to course which their nations may desire roundly to denounce. That is not a risk which either Der Fuehrer or Il Duco runs, In matters of this nature they are a law unto themselves and while it is unlikely that heads of constitutional governments will ever be given the same latitude which they have secured, it is quite apparent that without something of the nature they will be in danger of having their hands forced by the speed which dictators are undoubtedly able to control. Thus reading between the lines of the French declaration, it is clear that both M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain were brought to the realization that a new order of things had arisen in which historic limitations had to disappear, and the fact that they acted ac~ cordingly' is by no means the least pleasing feature ofan afar in which there have been so few.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.