The Reuter telegram from Paris, published today, gives a very hopeful survey of the world situation, with the exception of the Tientsin blockade, and it is to be hoped that this optimism will be justified by future developments. French opinion feels no doubt regarding the ultimate success of the present negotiations with Russia, an agreement is expected to be signed between France and Turkey this week, satisfactory parleys have been held between France and Spain and it is believed that certain outstanding questions between the ' two countries will soon be settled and a better understanding between the two restored, while the reports of German troop movements im Bohemia, Moravia, and on the}
Seigfried Line, while not apparently completely understood, are believed to constitute no immediate threat. That is probably the case, for it will be recalled that recent reports promised a bumper harvest for Germany, and, unless some very tempting opportunity presents itself to Herr Hitler in the meantime, it may be assumed that major political developments in Europe, so far as they await upon German initiative, will not take place until that harvest has been gathered in. That does not give a very long breathing space, it must. be admitted, but it should afford the Anti-Aggression Powers an opportunity of perfecting their undertakings for mutual defence against the time when crisis may be expected. For even if it be admitted that war is not necessarily inevitable, crises undoubtedly are, and the best possible preparation for dealing with them, is the reaffirmation of strength, and the intention to use it if necessary. The sooner that is completed the more satisfactory will be the outlook on the future, for until the democracies and Soviet Russia have settled the outstanding points in connection with the proposed tri-partite alliance a dangerous degree of uncertainty must prevail, which is not conducive of that security which is so urgently needed.
The real cause for anxiety are the negotiations between Britain and Russia. They have been dragged out over an unconscionably lengthy time, and though vague reports are forthcoming to the effect that progress is being made, anxiety will not be allayed until the alliance becomes an accomplished fact. The contention put forward in these columns that it was the absence of reciprocity in the British proposals which was the main stumbling block, is borne out in the comment which has appeared in "Investia" early in May when the Russian point of view was clearly indicated "The Soviet has held, and continues to hold, that if France and Britain really want to create a barrier against aggression in Europe a united front of mutual assistance should be created, primarily of the four principal Powers in Europe—Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Poland,—or at least three of them.—Britain France and the Soviet Union...
"It must be noted that this clear and fundamentally defensive and peaceable attitude of the Soviet Union, which, moreover, is based on the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations, has not met with sympathetic response on the part of Britain and France. As is known, Britain, with the consent of France, has made counter-proposals. Great Britain's suggestions avoid the Subject of a pact of mutual assistance between France, Britain and the Soviet Union, and consider that the Soviet Union should come to the immediate aid of Britain and France should they be involved in hostilities as a result of carrying out obligations they have assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Rumania... It follows that under this arrangement the Soviet Union must find herself in a position of inequality although she would assume exactly the same obligations as France and Brita That was written as long ago as May 1l, and must have been well within the knowledge of the British Government even before that date. It is consequently all the more difficult to understand why there has been all this delay, which even now does not appear to have brought the conclusion of the necessary alliance within the cate-gary of things accomplished. Since that date the interests of the European democracies have been challenged in Asia, and will probably continue to be until the perfection of the alliance strengthens their position.
Much speculation has been aroused as to whether Russia requires that assistance, which has been proffered her in Europe, shall be extended to Asia. Upon this question there are two schools of thought. One contends that to come to such an arrangement would be to antagonize Japan, and, therefore, should not be agreed upon. The other is firmly of the opinion that the agreement for mutual defence should apply in every instance where one or other of the parties to the agreement are likely to be attacked, that reciprocity should be extended into all spheres in which the three Powers have interests wi need protection. To the argument that in certain events Japan might be antagonized there does not appear to be much weight, in view of all that is happening in Asia. To retrain from entering into such an arrangement would most certainly not -placate Tokyo, while the adoption of the alternative theory could not possibly make matters worse than they are now. An arrangement for mutual protection against aggression in Europe, which leaves the back door open for the same thing in Asia, is on the face of it hopelessly illogical, and may turn out to be a factor of weakness which should not be permitted to exist. If a system of collective security is the only answer to the problem which the Axis Powers have posed, there should be no faint-heartedness in accepting it, and applying it no matter where aggression may take place. There should be none of these artificial limitations such as it appears Britain is still very reluctant to abandon, for what is required is a clear indication to the aggressor nations that, no matter where they may next embark upon their activities, those banded together for mutual defence will be ready to meet and resist them. In that alone is to be found the best guarantee of peace. By that means alone can this three-cornered blackmailing game be stopped, for it is in the belief in democratic timidity that the aggressor nations have gone as far as they have, and once that belief is shattered fewer risks will be taken, and more caution assume their place.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.