trustful or impatient of diplomatic spadework, the Japanese military forces in the North have been endeavouring to create conditions favourable to the advance of Sino-
Japanese ce-operation in economic adventure and to the dissipation of "anti-Japanese" sentiments. Having no spades, in. fact, the player resorts to clubs, The result is seen in the definite assumption by the of control over Peiping and Tientsin, whether the other objectives will speedily secured the event alone can tell. There are Chinese forces charged with the duty of resisting Japanese aggression, unless the negotiations tentatively being conducted between Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe and certain Nanking emissaries prove that the spades are of some use after all. Failing a peaceful settlement, Japanese plans in the North will presumably include a clearance of Chinese troops from Hopei and, perhaps, the regions down to the Yellow Rive To secure appropriate protection for this operation the lengthening of Japanese naval dispositions within reach of Nanking and Shanghai is necessary. That seems, primarily, to be the strategic object of the sudden descent of the Third Japanese Fleet upon the Whangpoo. The Admiral in command has been careful to indulge in no extravagant pronouncements He lays stress on the desire to maintain rather than disturb ordered conditions in Shanghai, This, no doubt, made it easier for the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. S. Okamoto, to give a satisfactory answer to the proper representations which Mr, N. Aall, as Senio1 Consul, had to tender to him yesterday in expression ofan international desire that the international concord of Shanghai should be faithfully respected. Mr, Aall made a similar approach to Mr. O. K. Yui, the Mayor of the City Government, and received equal satisfaction. It cannot be said that subsequent developments have allayed anxiety Marked difference of opinion on the need for Japan's resort to clubs does not necessarily prevent acceptance of her intention to avoid a threat to Shanghai's peace. Unfortunately intentions have to be judged by actions. The despatch of the strong naval reinforcements can hardly be regarded as arising out of the Hungjao Road incident; the plans are far too clear-cut and extensive for that theory to be tenable. In the light of pronouncements from Tokyo during the last month China can put only one interpretation on a naval movement which other coun' would straightaway be treated as an act of.war in itself. It is therefore superfluous really to discuss the exact significance of the activities of the Peace Freservation Corps, especially as it has now been reinforced by soldiers of the regular Chinese army. Without despairing of the possibility of a peaceful outcome, it is idle to deny that the situation here is critical. Official announcements from Consular sources show that. In surveying the situation it is necessary once more to record the view that Japanese actions seem to be inspired by a regrettable, though avoidable, misconception of conditions in China.' For months past organs of public opinion in Japan have been induced to take a gloomy view of Sino-Japanese relations. It has seemed as if it imagined that China's "anti-Japanese" activities had, somehow or other, been developed in a vacuum.
Measures taken by Japanese military and naval forces to cope with this reading of the situation have actually tended to produce the danger against which provision is now being so s ectacularly made. Faced with an unmistakable threat to her integrity and, knowing her w ness, China has been driver. to a state of nervous excitement in which atmosphere the generation of "incidents" is inevitable. A vividly tragic example has lately been afforded to Shanghai, The praiseworthy efforts of the Eh Japanese authorities here to main'
ess and reasonable restraint have not been unsuccessful, but they have been sadly prejudiced by the tension directly arising from the arrival of the Japanese naval reinforcements. Even now it is hoped that a sense of proportion will assert itself to avert a final deterioration of conditions here. Both sides, however, are caught in a coil of mutual distrust which, however beneficent the intentions of the wielder of the stronger club, is bound to aggravate the crisis. Unless some desperately sane stroke of diplomatic correct tion can be promptly applied catastrophe can hardly be avoided.
There remains the general issue as betwee: the Governments at Nanking and Tokyo. At this stage it is an arid task to elaborate the view that Japan is taking a military and naval sledge-hammer to crack a nut. It more useful to point to the smoothly developed potency of the sledge-hammer with the object of ascertaining whether, by the exercise of any special quality of statesmanship, the Government of China can avert the exposure of its administration to a shock of the utmost Considerable confidence rests in the of Mr, Kawagoe who, in an unition, has shown a praiseworthy readiness to persevere in diplomatic contact with Nanking. The Chinese authorities have now been considering the situation for over a month, It has gradually developed on lines which, as the days have passed, have absolved them from reproach if they made a desperate effort to extricate themselves from the dread disaster of war. Nor can they be blamed if, in bewildered contemplation of the sweeping inexorability of Japanese demands and the growing concentration of Japanese might on Chinese soil, they are irresistibly carried along on the stream of outraged national feeling. That gradual development, however, impels attention to the need for coming to grips with actualities now represented by Japanese military control of the North and Japanese naval strength on the Yangtze. Recognition of this urgency does not imp}: lack of sympathy with the Chinese Government in the predicament which it creates.
Sympathy has been freely expressed and active, but at this critical juncture it is of no practical value. Indeed reiteration of such sentiments might be regarded as a supererogatory affront to Chinese feelings. Time is now the essence of the problem which the Chinese Government has to face, The last fortnight—as was expected in a survey which this journal gave to the situation on Aug. 2—has seen a steady approach to the breaking point, Discussion and argument have to give way to concrete decisions. It is to be hoped, for China's sake, that her Government can now brace itself up to take those decisions, fearlessly and promptly. Even though the club hand is being menacingly displayed spades might still be the call, provided due regard be paid to time and consequence.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.