It was not very long after the passage of the Bill by the United States Congress giving independence to the Philippine Islands, that a certain section of the Filipinos began to express some doubts as to the wisdom of the agitation which had brought about such a step. Those doubts have been largely increased on both sides of the Pacific by the recent development of Japanese policy in China, and the general deductions to be drawn from the statements of Japanese statesmen. The cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" is all embracing, and there s by no means an inconsiderable body of; pinien, not only in the Philippines, but also in the United States, which realizes that if Japanese ambitions are to be fulfilled to the extent it is apparently planned, the United States will sooner or later have to decide either to withdraw from the western Pacific entirely, or prepare to defend its rights In this part of the world. For that reason the question of the refortification of Guam has come to the fore. The American people have a number of questions to decid whether they will abandon the plan of withdrawing from the Philippines; whether they will defend the islands under a grant of independence; whether a barrier should be established against the Japanese move southwards; whether the United States will maintain China's integrity and protect the "Open Door" in China, and whether through a circle of bases, beginning in Alaska and ceping across the Pacific, Japan shall be actified of American preparation to confine her within her own domain. It was' one of the Concessions which the United States made during the negotiation of the Washington Treaty that the fortifications already existing on Guam should be removed, and that undertaking was faithfully carried out.
The agreement to do so was arrived at in view of the general conditions it was desired to maintain in the Pacific, but as those conditions have been seriously changed by the unilateral action of Japan, it has been borne in upon the American Government that the new situation thus created requires revision of policies decided upon eighteen years ago.
Hence the Vinson Navy Bill proposing that Congress should authorize the construction of naval base facilities at Guam, a strategic American possession in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands, and the strengthening of 41 other bases, most of which are facing the Pacific. Unless the United States are completely to abandon the Philippine Islands to their fate, and allow of the possibility of their eventually being grabbed by Japan—they are in every way more desirable from the Japanese point of view than anything she can obtain in China,—they will have to face the fact that the protection of their present position in this part of the world necessitates that America will have to become a great Pacific Power, with all the responsibilities that such a decision entails. Future development appears to depend entirely upon the policy which Japan intends to follow. If, as it is anticipated, she rejects the invitations of America, Great Britain, and France, under the Treaty of 1921 to consult on the controversies which have arisen as a result of Japanese action in China, then it is obvious that the other Powers concerned will have to take such steps as are necessary to limit the field of her activities, and one such step is obviously to establish a naval base from which it will be possible to safeguard the Philippines from Japanese seizure, together with the reinforcement of such other bases as would provide the United States with plenty of places from which to command the Pacific. The "Army and Navy Register," in commenting upon the subject, puts the matter even more bluntly, stating that in view of the united stand of the Democracies in the Far East, and in view of the prospect that the United States will establish bases in the Pacific where they will threaten Japan's security, Tokyo authorities may turn round and request that such a conference shall be called. The view of that magazine, therefore, is that the threat which is thus in contemplation against Japan, may induce her to change her mind, and become somewhat more amenable to reason.
The inmortant point to be remembered in connection with this possible development in the United States, is that the whole subject is likely to change from being what might be termed a purely party matter, to one in connection with which much support will be found in both parties in Congress. In this connection the recent utterances of Mr. Alfred M. London, Republican Presidential candidate in 1936, and Senator Ernest Gibson, Republican, assume significance. International political trends during the last few years have produced a profoundly modifying effect upon the isolationist policy which was so greatly favoured in the United States, and that nation, instead of finding itself unperturbed by world events, has now become gravely interested. Nevertheless the belief should be avoided that, even if such a conference as is required were held, it would permanently solve the problems which are now being posed. The various agreements, to which Japan has been a signatory, covering questions in the Far East, are being disregarded by that nation on the ground that altering conditions,—alterations brought about in flagrant disregard for those agreements,—justify such a course. There is consequently little or nothing to ensure that if agreement were reached at any such conference it would be any more binding than have these previous documents, and until it again becomes fashionable in international morals to honour obligations, the counsels of prudence suggest that instead of using the proposed refortification as a means of bringing Japan to the conference table, it would be better to proceed with the work, and have the Guam base as an accomplished fact. The granting of such authority by Congress would undoubtedly give the United States a very powerful bargaining point, and might tend to have a modifying effect upon Japan's present instransigeance. An American naval base only 1,200 miles from Yokohama might prove a very potent factor in preserving the peace of the Pacific, and its actual existence, rather than a plan to build it, would make it an even more powerful weapon in the hands of the American diplomats.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.