Two interesting surveys of the present position with regard to the War will be found in another column. They are both of importance. Washington official circles are reported to be of the belief that an understanding exists between Herr Hitler and M. Stalin regarding their respective spheres in northern Europe, though Berlin is reported to be chagrined over the clumsy manner in which M. Stalin is extending Russian influence. That is perfectly understandable, for anything clumsier than the invasion of Finland it is difficult to conceive. Observers believe that Germany will suffer from Russian action for three reasons: 1, Russia is using war supplies against Finland, which would have been available to the Reich; 2, the Finnish war is alleged to be revealing unexpected weaknesses in the Red Army throwing doubt upon the efficiency of Soviet military aid to Germany, and 3, the indignation aroused amongst neutrals including the United States by the Russian attack on the Finns. It is probably because of some such reasons that there has arisen disunion amongst Herr Hitler's advisers, for it must be obvious that Moscow is not hoard~ ing its war material for the purpose of ultimately placing it at the disposal of Germany, for, of course, a consideration, but is actually using it for the purpose of furthering her own schemes, and whether or not that is done as a result of a secret understanding between Herr Hitler and M. Stalin is entirely beside the point. It will, however, be more than a little surprising if it ultimately turns out to be the case that Herr Hitler is in complete agreement with all that M. Stalin is doing, or is likely to do in the future, for if he is, then he has given the head of the Soviet Government a blank cheque which he is now filling in entirely to suit his own book. Any agreement for the division of Scandinavia must operate against Germany, for the greater the Russian controlled coastline in the Baltic the greater the reduction of the influence of the German navy. With the Russian plan for naval expansion the Reich must sooner of later face a menace which has been made all the more imposing by recent Russia successes.
From London comes another and wider review of the situation. In addition to the Soviet-German menace in Scandinavia there is the same combined threat in south-east Europe, where it is quite obvious the interests and influence of Italy,—the small wheel in the penny-farthing Rome-Berlin axis,—are being completely disregarded. It is suggested that Germany in her increasing need for raw materials might advance upon Rumania to the Carpathian Mountains while Russia would drive forward along the shores of the Black Sea aided by the friendly attitude of Bulgaria towards her. In these two movements, in Scandinavia and the Balkans, observers profess to see the extension of the present war into a general struggle The Allies could, and probably would Eo to the assistance of Norway and Sweden if they resisted Russo-German aggression, though in strict observance of international law they would have to stand aside if no such resistance were offered. In the Balkans the Anglo-French-Turkish mutual aid pact bars the way to fruitful aggression, for Ankara has only to say the word and the Allies can, and will place their forces along the eastern front to defend the interests of peaceful, independent countries. It is claimed, with apparently good reason, that Anglo-French troops in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa would easily permit of the creation of an Eastern Front, though much would depend upon the ultimate attitude of Italy, which might be a factor operating to some extent against it. With a neutral Italy such a front could be established with every prospect of success, though were that nation openly hostile the situation would undoubtedly become very complicated. In this connection it is doubtful whether Italy would readily take action in support of a combination between a nation which has grievously betrayed the principles for which Signor Mussolini stands, and Russia which represents everything for which he has an inveterate hatred. Signor Mussolini is unlikely to assist Herr Hitler to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, realizing that his relationship with Der Fuehrer has been sadly unproductive of results so far as Italy is concerned.
A third interesting speculation is to the effect that, with the Russian menace assuming the proportions it threatens to do, there may be a renewal of German propaganda in favour of stopping the war, and offering a common front to fight Bolshevism. The first reaction to that would undoubtedly be to tell Herr Hitler "You got yourself into this mess; get out of it yourself," It is a natural one, one which would stultify any drive which might be launched by Dr. Goebbels and his Ministry. It is more, for it succinctly states the only conclusion which can be reached after a closer scrutiny of any such proposed movement. Is it possible, after all the world knows of Herr Hitler and his per-tidies, that the democracies could trust him sufficiently to fight with him against the Russian threat which he himself brought into Europe? And if it were possible could there be any assurance that again at some later date Herr Hitler would not turn against the democracies who would: in fact be his saviours? The answer is that so long as Herr Hitler, or anyone else who thinks like him, is in power in Germany it would be impossible to give her that assistance which she might eventually need to extricate herself from the embarrassing situation in which she finds herself. For any such appeal to succeed Nazism would have to be destroyed for the evil thing it is, and its rule replaced by one which would command respect and trust. There can be no question of fighting Bolshevism for the salvation of a system equally as iniquitous, no question of fighting one evil that' another might survive. That is the reason why it is confidently expected that should the German Propaganda Ministery make any such appeal it will be rejected with scorn. That Minis try and the Government of which it forms a part will have to go before there can be any question of uniting with Germany in a common front against Bolshevism, for there can be no question of a common front in which there is not the completest confidence and trust between its component parts. A politically sane and healthy Germany would be worth the saving, but she has got to cure herself of her present madness before there can be any question of the democracies at present opposed to her joining in a common cause against Bolshevism.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.