After a lull of some months the Japanese forces have commenced a series of actions designed to bring about the fall of Hsuchow and thereby secure domination of the whole of the Tsinpu Railway and its junction with the Lunghai Railway. The Chinese have all along considered that this city was one of the main strategic points in their resistance to the Japanese invasion, and for a very considerable time have been busily engaged in perfecting its defences which are reported to be very strong, strong enough to be called China's "Hindenburg Line." The last few days have seen a considerable increase in the activities of the Japanese Army moving northward and with the recent capture of Pengpu, and Fengyang and the move towards Mengcheng the first steps towards the ultimate reduction of Hsuchow may be said to have been completed. The whole action is assuming greater dimensions with the Japanese attacking the Lunghai Railway from no fewer than five provinces, Honan, Hopei Shantung in the north and Anhwei Kiangsu in the south. The fighting is sequently, being carried on over a wide front. from the Tientsin-Pukow to the Peiping-Hankow Railway. It is quite probable that the Japanese high command will seek to bring about the fall of Hsuchow by cutting the Lunghai Railway somewhere to the west and at the moment it appears as though Kweiteh and not Hsuchow is the immediate objective, for as the armies advancing upon it from the north and the south draw closer together the salient around Hsuchow will be sufficiently squeezed to oblige the Chinese to withdraw. Kweiteh in this instance plays exactly the same role as Tazang did in the defence of Chapei, for it will be remembered that when the Japanese reached that important spot the danger of the encirclement of the Chinese forces in the Chapei salient was so great that withdrawal was the only prudent method of keeping the troops intact. Kweiteh need not necessarily have to fall before the Chinese positions around Huschow are rendered untenable, for the mere reduction of the distance separating the northern and southern Japanese forces will render it.imperative for the Chinese command to extricate itself.
That the Japanese may eventually succeed in carrying out their present plan seems to be fully realized by the authorities in Hankow, who are determined to make the whole move exceedingly expensive for the Japanese. The bitterness of the fighting is indicated by the reports that on occasion the Chinese have been able to beat off Japanese advances, and the crossing of the Hwai river is still being hotly contested. Roughly speaking the Japanese are endeavouring to advance in three directions, from the south towards Hsuchow and Kweiteh, from Tsining southwestward to the latter city, and down the Peiping-Hankow Railway towards Chengchow, the capture of which would be an additional step in turninz the Chinese position at Hsuchow. Indeed both Chengchow and Kweiteh are key posi tions upon which the fate of Hsuchow completely depends. With the capture of these three cities, if and when it is brought about, the Japanese campaign in China will assume a mew phase involving the ultimate fate of Hankow itself. With the whole of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway in Japanese hands, the portion of the Lunghai Railway westward to Chengchow will provide adequate communication with the Peiping-Hankow Railway and will provide the Japanese troops with excellent supply lines behind the contemplated advance through Anhwei towards Hankow.: For the moment the Japanese armies south of the Yangtze are purely on the defensive, seeking to consolidate the gains they have already made and preparing eventually to take part in the advance upon Hankow. If the Japanese plans, as they now appear, prove successful, the defence of China's temporary capital will have to meet at least three converging attacks. One from the north down the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and two others along each bank of the Yangtze and it seems to be quite clear that a successful resistance ta these advances can only be offered if the large number of troops at present operating in Anhwei and Kiangsu can be withdrawn in good order to reinforce those upon which the defence of Hankow will naturally devolve. P The prospects of severe fighting and, perhaps, the fall of Hankow itself, will not necessarily dampen the ardour of the resistance which China is presenting to the Japanese invasion. They have accepted the idea of a long-drawn-out struggle, with the possibility of repeated military defeats in the feld, believing that an intolerable strain will be placed upon Japan's resources, such as to bring ultimate victory to themselves. There are many who believe that this is not only possible but probable. In some cases the wish may be father to the thought, but the fact that it is also held in some high neutral quarters suggests that it is not so wild as some observers appear to think. It is, nevertheless, a strategy which, even from China's point of view is most expensive, but it is fully realized that the Chinese nation is imbued with a spirit of self-sacrifice which none of the Japanese successes up to the moment has done much to modify. Despite claims to the contrary there is very little real evidence that in the defeats which the Chinese troops have sustained in the field they have suffered any material diminution in morale, and though the impending battle for the Lunghai Railway may prove a distinctly fateful one to either side, its loss need have no greater effect upon Chinese determination than the fall of Shanghai or the capture of Nanking. A Japanese estimate has been published suggesting that the funds which China still has at her disposal will permit her to continue the struggle for a further year. By that time huge as are the Japanese commitments in China already they will have assumed enormous proportions. They will still be faced with the task of defeating the Chinese armies, and at the same time-will have to dissipate quite considerable forces for the maintenance of their lines of communication against the guerilla warfare which is now being so enthusiastically organized. It is not suggested for one moment that the Japanese will not be able to cope with the difficulties which such a situation would present, but it becomes increasingly apparent, that the further the Japanese advance into the interior, the greater becomes the demands made upon them, and they are already increasing to such an extent that it is permissible to wonder whether the Japanese fully realized what they were taking on when they initiated this venture,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.