A few days after the war had begun I received a letter from Admiral Bacon stating that he had designed a 15-inch howitzer that could be transported by road. Interested ili this astonishing assertion, I.sent for him.
He spoke with conviction about the general artillery aspects of the war, Predicting in particular that existing fortresses would not be able to withstand the shells of great modern Fisher).
In addition to this, the next day, I sent for Mr. Tennyson-d'Eyncourt, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and convened a conference.
As the result of it the Landships Committee of the Admiralty was formed by my orders under the presidency of!Mr. Tennyson-d'Eyn-
Court, reporting direct to me.
Why I Decided to Spend £70,000
From the formation of this committee on February 20, 1915, till the appearance of tanks in action in September, 1916, during the Battle of the Somme, there is an unbroken chain of causation.
Had the tanks proved wholly abortive or never been accepted, and had I been subsequently summoned before a Parliamentary Committee, I could have offered no effective defence to the charge that I had wasted public money on a matter which was not in any way my business.
The extremely grave situation of the war and my conviction of the need of breaking down the deadlock which blocked the production of these engines are my defence; but that defence is only valid in view of their enormous subsequent success.
There never was a moment when it.was possible to say that a tank had been "invented." There never was a person about whom it could be said "this man invented the tank." But there was a moment when the actual manufacture of the first tanks I listened with interest, and when during the next fortnight the forts frst of Liege and then of Namur were swiftly destroyed by the German siege guns I sent for Admiral Bacon again, asked whether he could make some howitzers for the British Army, and how long it would take.
He replied he could make a 15-in. howitzer in five months and there. after deliver one every fortnight. 1 thereupon proposed to the War Office to order ten.
I was kept closely informed about their design and progress, and learned that each one would be moved in the field in sections by eight enormous caterpillar tractors The pictures of thes" vehicles were extremely suggestive, and I at once asked whether they would be able to cross trenches and carry guns and fighting men or whether he could make any that would. As a result of the discussion that followed I @irected him to make an experiment. tal machine. The model showing promise, I ordered 30 to be constructed.
War Office Reject First "Tank"
It was not until May, 1915, that the first of these engines was tested by the War Office.
It was then rejected because it could not descend a four-foot bank and go through three feet of water (a feat not achieved by any tank up to the end of the war)
Thus ended the first effort to make a trench-crossing vehicle or so-called "Tank" during the Great War. The sequence of events in the second attempt to make a tank and secure its adoption by the military authorities was as follows: Quite independently of what has been. narrated above, about the middle of October Col. E. D. Swinton also realized the need of such a weapon. He accord. ingly broached the project to Colonel was definitely ordered, and there was a moment when an effective machine was designed as the direct outcome of this authorisation.
Somme Blunder Lost Big Chance I consider that the responsibility for the mechanical execution of the project was borne by Mr. Tennysond'Eyneourt. Without his high authority and immense expert knowledge the project could not have been cai ied to success But I sanctioned the expenditure of public money in reliance upon Mr. Tennyson-d'Eyneourt's gifts and knowledge, and his assurances that the mechanical difficulties could be solved, After I left the Admiralty at the end of May, 1915, another moment of extreme peril threatened the enterprise, The new Board of Admiralty proposed to terminate the contracts and scrap the whole project. Mr. Tennyson-d'Eyncourt, however, remained faithful to the charge I had laid upon him. After consideration, Mr. Balfour decided that the construction of one experimental machine should be proceeded with One alone survived. But this proved to be the "Mother Tank" which. displayed in Hatfeld Park in January, 1916, became the exact model of the tanks which fought in 1916, and was the parent and in principle the prototype of all the heavy tanks that fought in the Great War.
The scheme of attack by caterpillar vehicles was not put into operation until the first Battle of Cambrai in November, 1917.
It took the High Command nearly two whole years to learn to use tanks in the manner and conditions for which they were originally conceived. During the interval every conceivable mistake was committed which lack of comprehension could suggest Hanse At the end of October Col. Banke: wrote a paper on the need of this and other mechanical devices, which he circulated to the various members of the Cabinet directly concerned in the conduct of the war.
Reading this paper brought me back to the subject on which Admiral Bacon had already been given instructions, and on January 5 I wrote letter to the Prime Minister, from Which I quote the significant paragraphs:—1t would be quite easy in a short time to Rt up a number of steam Tractors with small armoured shelters which men and machine-guns could placed, which would be bulietpror arty or 50 of these engines prepared secret and brought into position, at nightfall could advance quite certainly into the enemy's trenches., smashing away, all the obstructions, and sweeping ihe wrenches with their, machine-cun fire and with grenades thrown out of ihe top.
Mr. Asquith, two or three day after receiving my letter of January 5. laid it personally before Lord Xitehener, and urged him strongly to prosecute research.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.