The Laugh on Them 'A saw boasted that he had enough petrol to list him two years.
Al challenged him, and he took them to his home "and produced "a. two-gallon can and a The Soviet invasion of Finland marked a turning point in American foreign wartime policy. To put the matter briefly it enabled the Administration policy to dominate Confessional policy instead of being subordinate to it. Ever since. 1935, when the first of the neutrality acts was passed, Congressional policy his been based on the assumption that the United States should take no part in other nations' quarrels but devote herself entirely to keeping out of war. In doing. this she should leave nothing to chance, but should avoid even moral support of one side or another, should treat all belligerents as equally culpable and place them all under the same impartial ban. Before the neutrality acts were passed the Administration, basing its policy on the impifeations of the Kel~ loge Pact, had evolved a theory that the United States had a duty asa great power open towns or civilian populations.
The reasons for the contrast between the public reaction to Russia's attack on Finland and Germany's on Poland lay mainly in the sentiment felt for the victim but also in the opinions held of the aggressor. There was first the disparity in size between Russia and Finland, then there was Finland's record as 'a debt-payer, her reputation as one of the leanliest nations in Europe and her accom~ pushments in the realm of sport. There had never been any traditional hostility felt in any section of the United States towards Finland as there had been toward England and to a lesser extent towards France. Even Poland, though Polish military leaders had aided the American Colonists in their War of Independence, had defaulted on her debt and in the eyes of many Republicans should never have accepted the Polish corridor. Fin body. The presence of troops in hostile territory carries its own explanation. It is a method of securing control over that territory and also a symbol of control. The {transplanting of Baltic Germans into sections of the Greater Reich indicates that the ultimate Sovietization of the formerly in= dependent Baltic States was an acknowledged part of the German Russian understanding.
That Russia should desire the restoration of areas of the old Russian Empire which won their independence following the last war is not a very difficult theory to believe. To it might be added jealousy of the progress made under their bourgeois governments, particularly Finland, a progress which provided a standing rebuke to the country of the interminable five-year plans. There must also be considered the ambition of the old Tsarist rulers to push along the northern petrol lighter.
Wrong Man jim, sepgcent rebuked the private angrily: Jones, why haven't you shaved this morning?"
Well;" said Jones, "a dozen of us were using che same bit of glass, and T must have shaved somebody else."
Sareasm "Don's you think, dear," asked one sweet thing, "that Im_ getting younger every day?" "Yes, daring." cooed the ollier sweet one, nould' never be surprised to see your name the Births column."
What A Waste!"
Lay Lecturer on ARP: "Among the clients for mustard-gos are petrol, ether and to place weight behind the country which was the victim of any breach of that pact. The force of world public opinion, including American public opinion, should be mobilized against any aggressor power and if other nations chose to bring in concert measures of economic or even, military sanctions. against that aggressor then the United States should do nothing to hamper their efforts.
That was the theory upon which the Administration were working when the wave of isolationist sentiment carried the neutrality acts through Congress. Every time the American Administration raised their voice against aggression hereafter, the powers addressed could see behind the gute of the Secretary of State the placard raised by Congress, "Dont worry; we won't let him do anything." Despite this dualism in the direetoin of American policy it was possible (provided the nations did not resort to war) for the Administration pursuing its own concep~ tion of what American foreign policy should bbe to strengthen the forces opposed aggression and hamper the aggressors. Yet always in the background was that warning. for that encouragement. When aggression proceeded to its ultimate extreme of war then the Administration policy would be swamped by Congressional policy and all belligerents would have to be treated alike, The President was, it was true, able to secure the passage by Congress of a new version of the Neutrality Act which, while maintaining legal impartiality, aid not hamper Great Britain's sea-power. After the revised. fact was passed it was possible for Britain to buy arms in the United States which she could pay for and transport. Germany could legally do the same but was unable to profit owing to Britain's command of the seas. But in making this concession Congress took away with one hand much that it granted with the other. It changed the provisions of a neutrality act which had the effect of present ing Germany with an Atlantic fleet as strong as England's but it substituted another which had the effect of sinking some 80 vessels of the merchant marine which kept England supplied with vital food stuffs and other products from abroad, America's merchant marine was taken out of the combat zone and forbidden to all at belligerent ports, It Femoved a greater number of vessels from England's vital trade lanes than the combined German mine and submarine cam-
American public opinion in the meantime which had been so strongly anti-Nazi that American entry into the war was discussed not only as a possibility but as a probability at the outbreak of hostilities, began to change. It did not grow more pro-Nazi but it definitely grew more isolationist and to some extent less pro-British. The old nonsense about British Imperialism clashing with the rival power of Germany was brought forward again. Excuses were found for Germany's action in the so-called iniquities of the Versailles Treaty. Britain, it was explained, was making war because her self-interest was involved. The self-interest of the United States required that she remain at peace. She should be particularly careful of British propaganda and any statement of British policy which did not coincide with the isolationist view of British motives was regarded as propaganda. In such an atmosphere the ability of the Administration to serve America's true interests, which every informed Government official' realized was the: triumph of the forces of Democracy against the forees of aggression, was ham= ered and rendered almost nil Then came the Soviet attack on Finland and an outburst of public indignation which Swept away any isolationist opposition like chaff before a hurricane. There was no nonsense about the need for an impartial attitude towards Europe's wars. Finland had the undivided support of everybody except the Communist minority and Russia was subject "fo almost universal condemnation, The President was able to pick up the scattered threads of Administration policy and place the full moral weight of the United States openly and publicly against the Soviet aggressor. The argument that America had Jand started from scratch and was never associated in the American mind with any thwarting of American ambitions; she was neither a commercial, financial nor political rival and had never been a past enemy.
Just as Finland was felt to be more deserving of sympathy than England, France or Poland so was Russia held to be more blameworthy than" Germany. Germany, in the American mind, could make some case for herself on the grounds that she had been discriminated against harshly by the Euro-can victors of the last war; that she had some reason to complain that her vast and energetic population were deprived of living-room. No one could maintain that Russ covering one sixth of the land surface of the globe was a have-not country suffering from claustrophobia and feeling she must expand or burst, She could hardly complain of encirclement.
Moreover while the American public did not regard Germany as any great threat to the United States, Russia was felt to be more dangerous. 'The' Communists were more active and subtle than the Nazi Bunds had achieved greater success in stirring Lup civil strife, Finally the American public were enraged against the Soviet because they felt they had been taken in, Nothing very much was ever expected of Germany, but Russia was felt by so many people to the one country which really cared for the common man, not just the Russian scommon man but the ordinary folk everywhere, She had also fooled them into thinking of liber as the champion of peace of the rights of small nations and as the enemy. of Fascism, Gradunly popes that there were great trading possibilities in Russia died, hopes that the Americans whose property had been confiscated during the revolution -would be repaid vanished. Even the promises made at the time of recognition, that Communist propaganda inspired by ' Russian leaders Would cease, were broken. But it was still felt that some good might come from the country. This hope grew gradually weaker as the German-Soviet alliance was followed by the Soviet-Japanese truce, and the invasion of Poland. It was completely des-toyed by the attack on Finland 'The reason why the attack on Finland was looked upon as something far worse than the German attack on Poland was ¢xpressed forcefully by the American columnist Jay Frankain. was, he suggested, akin to' cold blooded' murder. "People are to condone killings" which represent per= sonal quarrels and human situations, say family feud or_vendetta.... The World War Ty, up to the Soviet attack upon Finland, remained within the confines of the international vendetta, Poland, Germany, France and England were alike entangled in the web of alliance and counter-alliance which has paralyzed European statesmanship since the fall of the. Roman Empire. Generally speaking the victims of this system have got what they asked for and while the fate of Poland or Czechoslovakia excited pity, jus tice required a consideration of the whole set of circumstances leading up to the tragedy. In the ease of Finland no such issue fg involved."
This conception of Europe, it might be marked in passing, is a favourite one in America. It enables the Americans {0 maintain their attitude of moral aloofness without suffering fiom any qualms of consicence. Europeans are by nature warlike, {Europeans are always quarreling over boundary disputes. Hence we Americans would be foolish to take sides in Europe's quarrels or be deceived by subtle propaganda into believing one side has right on its side and the other side wrong. There is always a lot to be said against both sides. That is the American attitude. So much has been said in the United States about foreign propaganda creating a false picture of Europe in America that no one has stopped to consider that American propaganda in Ameri-fea may have created an equally false pleture of Europe. The Finnish case brought this omission home.
Rosy hopes are built on the assumption that Hitler must be growing more and tip of the Scandinavian peninsula till an open sea port was safely in Russian hands.
Voice from the back: "That ud be an awful waste, Miss. Could "you not drink the whisky ind then breathe on it?"
Ping Pong Armen a heated argument, Mrs. Brown had
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.