Even before the launching of the Soviet Russian attack on Finland, which must have its consequences in regard to supplies, considerable doubt was cast on the extent of Russi material assistance to Germany following the conclusion" of the Russo-German agreement. Examination of the possibilities of help from other sources, such as Manchoukuo, has also induced an attitude of extreme scepticism regarding the magnitude of the economic ally which Germany has acquired. Professor Bruce C. Hopper, of Harvard University, in the winter issue of "Foreign Affairs," says quite frankly that the expectations freely publicized by Germany are largely mythical and are based on hopes, not on facts. Excluding Russian shipments of manganese ore, which could be increased, Professor Hopper observes that there are no great surpluses of anything in Russia despite her vast resources. Domestic requirements of oil have arnest overtaken production capacity and foodstuffs rank in the same category. Even if these resources were easily available, the greatest weakness in the plan is transport facilities. As very little can be transported by water owing to the British blockade, tremendous strain would be thrown on the railway systems of Germany and Russia and quantities of rolling stock vastly exceeding the present joint resources would be required to transport the products needed to fill German requirements. For instance, to transport 8,000,000 tons of oil a year from the Caucasus to Germany would require 55,000 tank cars, which is twice as many as Russia possesses. Extending the transport problem to the Far East, to haul from Manchoukuo to Germany, 2,300,000 tons of soya beans, needed to replace the 47,000 tons of vegetable oils imported in 1937, would require $25 trains, containing 16,250 freight cars constantly under load not mentioning the turn journey over a distance of 4300 miles. Transportation of manganese ore would be more feasible as it could be done with only 3,000 freight ears. Any effort on an individual product might be partly carried out but the simultaneous transport of these three commodities in a quantity sufficient to meet German needs is a task far beyond the practical capacity of the Soviet railway system.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.