The officials of the Ministry then set up saw that their duty was to ce-ordinate the control of both ships and cargoes so as to bring trade needs and shipping capacity into direct line. Tonnage available had fallen by a quarter by 1917, and the fall in entrances at ports was proportion ately greater. Imports were down by a third compared with 1913, even though the ratio of imports to tonnage had risen. There was urgent need for the closest ce-operation between the Government controls over wheat, sugar and munitions and the volume and direction of shipping. With its eyes opened to the crucial importance of carrying capacity, the Ministry could plan ahead. The need to save shipping by restricting non-essential imports was recognised. Fante de mieux, tonnage was concentrated on the North Atlantic routes to bring in food and munitions, Energetically the ports, quays and sidings were cleared of undue congestion; labour was mobilized, trucks were pooled and goods lying unduly jong were penalized. Plans went beyond the cutting of old-standing knots like these. Inter-Allied import programmes were adjusted by joint action to the shipping capacity available—a policy possible already in this war because of the pool planned between Britain and France. Above all—and under the new threat of unrestricted submarine warfare—ship-building was pressed forward. The priority of the Admiralty was abated; materials were freed for the commercial yards. All this was maximize shipping turnover and capacity been fully realized earlier. As it was, stringent State control, coming in when the emergency was already extreme, was compelled to sever valuable commercial and mercantile connections. But it was a shipping policy, though an emergency one.
180-67—05 The Problem Jan. (NE)
9.63 N 11
N. x.
Sugar No. 3. Sugar No. 4
Mar.
May Sept.
Sept. 15934-51 +14 BA
Chicago Wheat Chicago Corn May 10134-10114—1 July 884-88 3
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.