Even a month ago the possibility of a Germany invasion of the British Isles was being anxiously canvassed in the Home press, and while some appeared to think that such an invasion was a possibility in the near future, the majority of writers were convinced that such thing could take place. The invari able lesson of history has been that a serious invasion in the face of an admittedly superior fleet is mot a practical proposition. To that the answer is made that aircraft can redress the balance. That is open to very considerable doubt. It is quite true that local super-ferity in the air kept British naval vessels from penetrating the Skaggerak—and the Kattegat, but that was not because the ships could not go in, but because the Admiralty felt that to send ships into those waters in the circumstances would be to run the risk of losing units which might be more urgently required at some other time and in some other place. Obviously to sacrifice import ant ships on what was after all a side show would "have been entirely wrong. Apart from that one instance the war so far has shown that German air power has entirely failed to prevent British' war vessels using any waters they wished to use. Those ships: would undoubtedly be used against any tempted invasion by the enemy and the target they would have would be an immense tone. It should be borne in mind when discussing such possibilities that to carry a force of 100,000 men, and that is small enough {in al conscience when the number of troops under arms in Britain is twenty times as great, requires about 150 fair sized vessels, i smaller, more would be required. To send them piecemeal would be to invite piecemeal defeat. To send them in convoy would be to present to the British flotillas of high speed twisting, and turning destroyers, and motor torpedo' boats the most vulnerable target it is possible to imagine. When what was done to the German troops convoyed by sea to Norway is remembered, when thousands of German soldiers lost their lives by Yeason of British submarine action, what would happen to a big convoy, comparative-unescorted by reason of German naval losses can readily be conceived.
The invasion of the British Tsles presents problems which are not met in ordinary in-visions by land. In the case of the latter millions of mechanized forces can be assembled in readiness, and at the zero hour can make a furious dash into the enemy country with all the speed which modern motors can provide. For the transportation of an invading army by sea very different considerations arise. The element of specd is lost, ando a very large extent the advantage of mechanization is no longer of importance. Tanks, lorries and the like have to be hoisted into a ship, and on arrival at destination—a most unlikely event, as shown above,—hoisted out, so that, unless the unloading is not to be hopelessly prolonged, it Would have to take place where there were adequately handling facilities. That in its turn reduces the number of possible landing places and increases the ease with which they can be defended. Any idea that the Invasion of Britain will be just as easy as. that by Julius Caesar, or William the Conqueror can be dismissed off hand, for the invading troops would first have to force a passage across the seas, find suitable places: for disembarking the heavy material which modern warfare necessitates, and which would be necessary to meet the mechanized forces of the defenders, and even then be: subject {0 the attentions of the defenders uring the days required for unloading, and assembling men and material. Such invasions} were possible when there was no sea force first to be dealt with, and when the soldier caryled most of his impedimenta upon back, but the present day concept of conduct ing war and the heavy material with which it is waged are in themselves factors which operate against any commander secking to throw large forees overseas against a highly organized island defence. Lest it be thought that these opinions refer only to an attempt throw German troops across the Channel, it must be pointed out that to strike at any other coast would involve longer sea journeys for the invaders and consequently render their conveys even more vulnerable.
There is also the opinion to be met that Herr Hitler would seck to land at several points simultaneously in the hope that at Toast some of his men would secure a foothold in Britain. It is a possibility which must be (aken into consideration, though it is doubtful whether the enemy has sufficient shipping available to undertake so gigantic a venture. It is to be seen, therefore, that the silver sea which serves Britain in the office of a wall Or 28 a moat defensive to 2 house, Against the envy of less happier lands: is still ani overwhelmingly important factor with which any invader will have to deal, and not all the air force which Germany commands will be able to prevent the British Navy from taking full advantage of the defence which it offers. There remains, of course, the parachutist troops. Unless backed by a substantial invading! force they have merely an annoyance value, for Germany cannot hope to do much on British soil without landing troops in some
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.