Rome, for the purpose of meeting Signor Mussolini, will be watched with the greatest possible interest in practically all the chanceries of the world, and certainly by the public of Europe, for within the next few days the whole of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement will have been subjected to the first real test since the signing of the Anglo-Italian agreement, in the first instance, and the Munich accord in the second. With regard to the latter, it has been stated by some of his critics that the olive branch with which he returned from that momentous meeting has shed its leaves and that all he has in his hand now is but the bare twig. Certainly, so far as Germany is concerned, that appears to be ase, and, while, taking the long view, Anglo-German relations may not worsened, there can be no gainsaying the fact that they have not improved in accordance with those hopes which were expressed in October of last year. It may be safely stated that were Anglo-German relations as satisfactory as Anglo-Italian,—though even here there is plenty of room for improvement.—the prospects of Europe being able finally to avoid war would be infinitely greater than they are at present, and it is by no means unlikely that Mr. Chamberlain will seek through the good offices of Signor Mussolini to bring about an improvement in that connection. It would be worth trying, though it would necessitate the realization by Germany that the British contention that the colonial issue is no longer a matter of practical politics is something which cannot be ignored. Be that as it may, it is possible that this visit to Rome may be productive of much good. It is not to be expected that Mr. Chamberlain will return from it with any cut and dried formal agreement. There is no reason to believe that that is contemplated by either statesmen, and if the whole visit is regarded as a series of exploratory discussions, that view will probably in the event turn out to be the correct one. If, as a result of the conversations, a complete and thorough understanding of the two nations is arrived at, a great deal will have been accomplished.
Whether it will be possible to arrange for the Four Power conference, which it is claimed Germany wants so badly, remains to be seen. There is no reason at the moment why, in view of the definitely provocative attitude of the German Government as evidenced by the antics of the Press over which it has complete control, any such suggested conference could be expected to meet with success. The French attitude with regard to the Italian claims is perfectly definite. France will make no concessions of territory, and in view of very emphatic statement it is difficult to see what good effects could arise from a conference where at least one of the parties bases. its position on a question of national prestige. There will be no mediation by Mr. Chamberlain in this connection. To endeavour to do so, in view of the attitude adopted by the Quai d'Orsay, would in the circumstances be an act of disloyalty to a loyal ally, and would at the same time probably call for a rebuff, something for which no statesman ever goes in search. Taking everything into consideration it would be much better for France and Italy to straighten out their mutual difficulties unaided by any third party. That failure to arrive at an adjustment might lead to war is a contingency which cannot be ignored, but there is the possibility that the risk is more apparent than real, especially if the expert view that Germany is unlikely to give Italy support in the event of serious occurrences proves correct. In this connection it may be remarked that Italy has contributed more to the Berlin-Rome axis than has Germany, and has all along been on the paying end and not on the receiving. But apart from those two points there is much of Anglo-Italian concern which remains to be talked over. There is the whole subject of the relations between the axis and the democratic Powers, in view of what happened at Munich; there is a number of comparatively minor points,—nevertheless of some importance,—such as paving the way for new trade negotiations, the final delimitation of the frontiers between British and Italian colonial possessions and the future status of the Mediterranean. It may be possible to discuss how for it will be possible to meet Italian aspirations with regard to the control of the Suez canal, but in any event even so brief a survey is indicative of what can be discussed for the improvement of Anglo-Italian understanding.
There will be, nevertheless, some anxiety "s to the final outcome of the conversations. Not a few believe that democratic statesmen, meeting dictators face to face, are at a definite disadvantage. Indeed the meetings over the Czechoslovakian: crisis emphasized that point, and in this respect it must be pointed out that in effect Mr. Chamberlain vis-à-vis of Signor Mussolini, is in no better a position than was President Wilson when attending the Versaille peace conference. There is just the one exception, and that is that so long as the Prime Minister commands a majority in the House of Commons that body might be expected to ratify whatever he does, if a formal agreement is reached, though British political history since the Munich meetings does not preclude the idea that in certain circumstances Mr. Chamberlain might find revolt amongst the ranks of his supporters. It would be idle to believe that though Anglo-Italian understanding has improved since April of last year the old cordiality has been revived. Count Ciano has indeed made that quite clear in one of his speeches. The traditional friendship has not yet been restored, probably will not be so long as the Rome-Berlin axis continues, but that is no reason why the betterment of relations, even within those limits, should not be earnestly sought. Much will depend upon the results achieved. If Mr. Chamberlain returns to Britain without something substantial to show in the way of further appeasement his own political future might quite easily be imperiled. His policy can only be justified in the eyes of a large section of the British electorate by success, for it cannot be denied that the course followed over the Czechoslovakian crisis was more than a little distasteful to a large section of it. If he returns with emphatic evidence of a better Anglo-Italian understanding, it will reinforce the belief that a rapprochement with Germany may still be possible. If he does not, the second state may not prove to be worse than the first, though it most certainly will not have shown any improvement.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.