The Archive · 1939

GERMANY'S SUBMARINES

Jan. 4.

The announcement of Germany's intention to build submarines to a tonnage parity with Great Britain recalls the history of negotiations between the two nations during the past three years, and is indicative of how quickly charging circumstances bring about altered jout_ necessarily modifying agreements arrived at. As a result of negotiations between the two countries in 1035 it was greed that the aggregate naval strengths of the British Commonwealth and Germany should be in the ratio of 100 to 35 respectively. This was to represent the per= manent relationship between the two Powers, and was not to be affected by the construc tion of other Powers, although in the event of abnormal construction by other Powers, the German Government reserved to itself the right to invite the British Government to examine the situation thus created. While not exceeding the 100-35 ratio in total ton nage, Germany was to have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the oral tonnage possessed by the members of the British Commonwealth, though she undertook, however, not to exercise this right save when an exceptional situation arose, and then not before giving Great Britain notice and discussing the step in a friendly spirit, normal circumstances the German submarine tonnage would be 45 per cent. of that of the British. Because of the fact that Germany has been building submarines of smaller individual tonnage, she is at the present moment possessed of 72 of such craft compared with 69 owned by Great Britain, and if her present intention are carried out, and the present individual tonnage for these vessels allowed to rema' at its present Agure, on the completion of the proposed new programme Germany would be possessed of no fewer than 160 submarines as compared with the 69 British. It is possible for Ger many to Laild to the smaller tonnage because of the limited sphere in which it was propos JI she would find it necessary 'o operate, while the need for larger craft on the part of Great Britain arises from the fact that her 'T, imperial defence needs require that they might be capable of going, to any part of the world.

On July 18, 1937, after negotiations tending over more than a year and a half, Great Britain concluded two naval agreements with Russia and Germany as a result of which those two countries accepted in the main the provisions of the London Peace 'Treaty of 1936, and virtually became partners to it. In the agreement with Russia, however, a reservation was included excusing that' country from furnishing information with regard to her ships constructed and employed in the Far East, and of going through the process of consultation and delay in case she felt herself threatened by Japan; and both Russia and Germany were allowed to mount a certain number of cruisers with 7-in, guns, although the Naval Treaty had fixed 6-in, as the maximum. It is stated that this latest German announcement with regard to the increase of her submarine force is in the nature of a reply to the Soviet's naval building programme. It is alleged that the Russian Government have already laid down seven heavy cruisers, and it is to be assumed that these are being built in Europe. This the German authorities claim p rmits them to lay down five more such vessels, and it is clear that if this is indeed the case, Great Britain in her turn would within the implications of the ratio arrived at in 1935 be allowed to strengthen her forces under the same classification. It is apparent, then, that the exceptional situation foreseen in the agreement of 1935 has been brought about by the action of the Soviet in embarking upon a new naval programme in Europe, and it is quite plain that the naval Powers of the world ure likely to be involved vicious circle which may in the end completely nullify the understandings which have already been arrived at. Thus as the Japanese naval programme has led to the invocation of the escalator clause by Great Britain and the United States, so Russian faction is leading to a modification of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, not much by the introduction of competitive building between the two, but because Germany feels the necessity of being able better to meet the Russian naval menace.

The viciousness of the whole matter is apparent from the comments of Mr. Hector Bywater, whose expert qualifications as a naval writer are undoubted. To offset the potential threat to the British Navy of the increased German submarine force, new surface anti-submarine vessels will be required. That will permit Germany to build more surface tonnage while still maintaining the tonnage ratio established in 1935, and as German naval strength increases vis-A-vis of Russia, the latter is expected fo take offsetting measures which starts but another revolution of the unhappy circle. 11 is obvious that with submarine force less than half, numerically of that of Germany, an increase in British anti-submarine craft becomes an imperative necessity, for while according to the Munich Agreement the last thing either Germany or Great Britain is supposed to want is warfare' between themselves, it would be the height of foolishness on the part of Whitehall if it were to permit that most interesting document to take the place of material defence upon which the present state of the world makes it more prudent to rely. There is something in the suggestion that these German submarines, smaller though they be, would be capable of going to the assistance say, of the Ialians in the Mediterranean, the' event of a general conflagration, or of carrying out raids on British' trade routes.

They might not be able to go as far afield as the British submarines, but they would have sufficient cruising radius to make them very serious threat to British supplies in the event of another attempt at a submarine blockade. That Great Britain, as a result of

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