It is not likely that the protest which has been lodged with Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, by M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador, in connection with Lord Winterton's allegation that Russia did not offer to help Czechoslovakia in the crisis but "only made very vague promises owing to her military weakness" will have much effect upon the public estimation of the part Russia played in the matter. It must be apparent to all who followed the story of the crisis, that at no time was Soviet Russia regarded as any very really important factor in the matter. It is not to be denied that the Soviet has built up an imposing military machine, and if it could go to war might play a very important part, but the conviction is widespread that the recent purges are not only indicative of the restlessness of the military caste under the Government of Kremlin, but also of the recognition of that fact by the latter. The execution and removal of outstanding military leaders not only weakened the army, but@re symptomatic of the suspicion with' which M. Stalin regards them, their loyalty ahd the power they possess, The successful prosecution of war, particularly in the case of Russia, would necessitate the subordination of civil needs and processes to the imperative demand of the military, and—the danger to the Kremlin is that, once Russia is involved in a war, the military who for some years past has had no great use for the government would be able to assert itself to the latter's undoing. The instability of the relations bet wi the Government and the Army in Russi is such that they are mutually weakened, and the cqiclusion to be drawn is that only as the last desperate course will the Kremlin resort to hostilities. In the circumstances Lord Winterton's summing up of the situation is most probably correct and not the "perversion of the actual position," which the Soviet Embassy claims it to be.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.