When the question of securing limitation of air armaments comes up for discussion it is hardly likely that the negotiations will go very far on any proposal that the British air force should be limited to one-third the size of Germany's. It is obvious that the considerations which might apply in settling the ratio of naval strength between the two countries cannot be applied in the air. Any country, with so small a force as one-third of that of a possible enemy, would in the event of hostilities be in no position to inflict that retaliation, which, unfortunately, must be accepted as part of any air-defence scheme. Consequently it will be very surprising indeed if Great Britain consents any degree of inferiority in this respect to any European nation, for her interests demand that in the event of an attack she shall be able io reply effectively, and she most certainly would be unable to do so were she to agree to any such proportion as has been suggested in ihe European Press. From another point of view the generale needs of the Empire defence scheme demands that the same considerations shall apply as in the case of the navy. The duties of the air force can be just as widespread as those of the Empire's sea arm, and while this should not be advanced as a reason for insisting upon as proportionally powerful an armament in the air, it is the most cogent reason possible for contending that a position of inferiority is incompatible with the problems which defence of the Empire presents. Indeed it is doubtful whether a solution of this particular difficulty will be found in any attempt to establish such a ratio, and the real answer will in all probability be found in endeavouring to arrange some limit beyond which none of the parties who may negotiate would go. Valuable as any such arrangement would be, it is an open question whether the present is the appropriate time for commencing any such discussions. On the face of it the Powers would be better advised to seek means to solve all those other outstanding matters which, so long as they remain unsettled, must militate against the establishment of such relations as would permit the discussion of arms limitation with any. prospect of success. It may be that the two subjects could be pursued simultaneously, but even then the removal of potential causes of war is of greater urgency than decisions as to what weapons it should be fought with.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.