Although it savours of reading the will before the subject of its disposition has had a decent time to expire, speculations on the consequences of a Nationalist victory in Spain are only natural in view of the imminent fall of Barcelona. Since "General Franco, the protector of the church and its dignity, selected Christmas for the unleashing of his most intensified offensive of the entire campaign, rapid progress has been made and Barcelona's defences so weakened that the Nationalist forces are in sight of the city. All Barcelona civilians have been mobilized, every ounce of strength has been flung into the line, foreign residents are preparing to evacuate and nothing short of a miracle can save the Catalan capital, If General Franco wins and establishes a Fascist state, does it mean that he must reward appropriately Germany and Italy, who have liberally assisted him with men, aeroplanes and supplies? Gratitude is not the least marked of Spanish characteristics but as the Spanish conflict, in its latter stages, has been so obvious a part of a general political plan evolving from totalitarian ideas some sort of advantages must accrue. One of the mysteries of the Spanish conflict, which started as nothing more than a civil war, has been the amount of foreign assistance and the re. cruitment of so-called volunteers who curiously fell into well-organized and disciplined divisions which amateurs and adventurers do not quickly assume. Then, of course, is the peculiar theory of non-intervention which was transformed into a series of restraints by some well-meaning powers to prevent other members of the committee from intervening too openly. When the volunteer withdrawal plan was initiated it was devised to withdraw anywhere from 10,000 to 40,000 men on each side and there is no doubt that large numbers have been withdrawn, but that appears to have caused no weakening of General Franco's strength. His foreign divisions and his German and Italian aeroplanes have been the backbone of the renewed offensive on Barcelona and he still appears to command large forces of foreign auxiliaries. An authoritative London opinion has it that General Franco's following is essentially Nationalist and therefore Germany and Italy are not likely to gain any strategic footing in the country, but this does not preclude the creation of a situation which will emphasize Italy's Tunisia and Djibouti claims against France, who will find an extremely pro-Italian regime along her western frontier. The French attitude regarding Tunisia and Djibouti has been made perfectly clear in declarations following M, Daladier's tour, and Paris opinion inclines to the belief that' France will take similar measures in Spanish Morocco and elsewhere if Italian forces remain in Spain or Majorca in the event of a Franco victory. Signor Mussolini has made certain assurances which are accepted at face value and will be so accepted as long as they are valid, but foreign assistance has constituted such an integral part of General Franco's campaign that it is extremely unlikely that this influence will evaporate if he wins, and the new problems envisaged regarding France, and also British interests in the Mediterranean, must arise. No civil war in decades has been fought with such an abandonment of the principles of neutrality by powers iting the outcome as a lever for further political advancement.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.