The turning movement by the Germans in Flanders which was noticed a day or so ago has now developed into a fierce onslaught on the-Allied positions stretching from Ab-neville on the Channel to Rethel, and thence to Sedan. That it has come so quickly after the German effort in Flanders* indicates that the first battle did not exhaust Germany's immediate resources for a continuation of their Blitzkrieg. There is a wide discrepancy between the Allied and the German reports of the first day's fighting. The Germans profess to have pierced the Allied lines in a number of places, and the Allies while admitting there had been some degree of infiltration, apparently by tanks, claimed that onthe whole the day was favourable to them. What has happened is that the experience of the sudden German thrust through Holland, and Belgium, has been availed of in perfecting the new line in France. New anti-tank defences have beef constructed, consisting of successive points of support solidly held, and deeply spaced. These depend upon improved natural obstacles, such as water lines, rows and pits in abandoned villages which have been specially fortified and thick woods bristling with anti-tank guns. It is alleged that between these supports it is doubtless possible for the tanks of the enemy to penetrate, but infiltration serves little purpose if German infantry as well as vital supplies for the tanks themselves are unable to follow. With the exception of three bridgeheads on the south bank of the Somme the Allied forces are behind a water line which stretches almost without a break from the mouth of the Somme to the eastern French border, canals joining the various rivers and thus providing an obstacle which it is difficult for tanks to pass. It is clear that, where they have been able to advance must be from the three bridgeheads which the Allies were unable to reduce before the new German attack commenced, and it is in those localities where the most action is to be expected.
Late on Wednesday night it was reported that the three principal points of attack were Amiens, Peronne and the Aillette Canal north of Soissons, and from this it seems that while a direct move on Paris is the primary objective, the Germans would willingly postpone that, if they thought that there was a chance of seizing a further portion of the Channel coast. Should they be able to break the French line at Peronne, or near Soissons, doubtless they would push on towards Paris, but on the other hand if they are able to get through near Amiens another move towards the coast is to be expected. Reports from the three points mentioned above on Wednesday night indicated that the German onslaughts had been held, and that the French' positions remained intact. Thus an interesting, and important action has commenced, the Germans again endeavouring to embark upon a battle of movement, with the Allies equally determined that it shall remain one of position. If they succeed in achieving their object, and holding on to the line they have already established the decision in this new phase of the struggle will rest with them. Obviously from their defence positions they should be able to inflict immense damage upon the enemy, for in such circumstances the attackers inevitably pay heavily for whatever ground they may make while the defenders, because of their sheltered positions, are unlikely to suffer anything like the same extent. It is for reasons such as these that French military circles consider that Wednesday developed favourably for their arms, emphasizing that the success formerly obtained by the German armoured divisions in previous fighting depended largely upon the element of surprise which is now absent. White the land forces were locked in a gigantic struggle reaching from the Channel to the French eastern boundary, the Allies' air forces were actively engaged not only in meeting and fighting off the aeroplanes used to support the enemy infantry, but were busy bombing German positions in their rear and military objectives well inside Germany. It is obviously impossible to obtain any accurate idea of the damage which is being done, for about that the enemy will naturally preserve a discreet silence, but the little information which has become available clearly demon-strafes that the Allied bomber is just as effective as the German, and most certainly just as accurate.
With the Allies and the Germans locked in a titanic struggle along a line one hundred and twenty miles long it will be necessary to watch developments with the utmost patience. This battle should prove to be an exceptionally lengthy affair, and it may be weeks before a decision is reached one way or the other. It is interesting, and gratifying to know that British troops are in positions alongside their gallant French Allies. It should not be unduly long before Bri can sent substantial reinforcements across the Channel. There is much material damage to be replaced, because of the losses in Flanders, but even here, with the factories turning out material incessantly since the beginning of hostilities, there should already be in existence fair quantities to repair the wastage. Of men, large numbers who have been called up since September last, should by now have completed their training, while those men who have been evacuated from Flanders, after a rest and re-equipment, will be able to return to France and again take up the struggle in which they have already so greatly distinguished themselves. And behind all those there are still the vast potentilities of the Allies, their Dominions and their dependencies which substantiate the promise that whatever the result of this battle the war will continue until: Allied victory is assured. It must always be remembered that the Germans are fighting with resources which while large have decided limits to which the enemy are racing with a speed completely in keeping with the magnitude of their efforts of the past three-and-a-half weeks. The speed with which they have embarked upon this new offensive should be heartening to the Allies, for it affords abundant proof that their enemy are expending every effort to gain victory before the vast outlay in material and other resources forces them to call a halt and await the assumption of the offensive by the Allies. They have to win quickly. The Allies can afford to wait with the knowledge that every day brings the enemy closer to exhaustion.
A Friend of Britain A good friend of Britain and the British passed away when Prince lesato Tokugawa died"in Japan, for he devoted much of his time in endeavouring to pour oil on the troubled waters of Anglo-Japanese relations. "England," he said on one of his many visits to that country, " is my second home, I am always happy here." Prince Tokugawa paid his first visit to London in 1877, when as a boy of 14, he went to school at Sydenham College, Four years later, he was about to go up to Cambridge when political affairs recalled him to Japan. Subsequently he returned to England in 1910, in 1924 and in 1930 when he attended the Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in London that summer and was received by the King. Three years later, while making a world tour in connection with the International Red Cross Conference to be held in Tokyo the following year, he paid a fifth visit to London, This time he explained, he was on a "purely private visit to see old friends and school fellows," but he was again received by the King and had conversations with many prominent politicians, He himself expressed the hope that, by hunting up his old friends, he might help to drop a little oil on the troubled waters and keep alive the ancient friendship between England and Japan, The Prince's chief claim to fame abroad is due perhaps to the dignified part he played at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 as Head of the Japanese delegation He was not a brilliant man but he had plenty of good honour and common sense; never ruffled, he made an admirable public figure and had headed a number of important public and philanthropic organizations in Japan with distinction. He was President of the Japan Red Cross Society and of the League of Nations Association of Japan. Although showing no inclination to any particular political party, he was generally considered as an impartial and well-balanced statesman and enjoyed much public esteem, A member of the House of Peers ever since the introduction of the Parliamentary system into Japan, he became its President in 1903, a position which he. held until June 1933 when he resigned, On the resignation of the Yamamoto Cabinet in 1914, the Emperor invited him to form a Cabinet, an invitation which he was, however, allowed to decline. His eldest son, Iemasa, was appointed as Japan's first Minister to Canada, after serving previously both in London, as a Secretary to the Japanese Embassy, and at Sydney as Consul-General in Australia Strange Report A report which has been cabled from Shanghai to the Japanese press that the French Concession would shortly be transferred to the United States hardly called for the emphatic denials given to it by American and French officials here yesterday. It nevertheless seers to have been' taken seriously by the Tokyo who report that the Government of Japan very concerned over the prospect. That this is not the case can be confidently believed; the Japanese Government have shown a lively sense of the realities of the Shanghai situation, and are not likely to be deceived by such a story, which seems to be the work of some inadequately endowed reporter going off at half-cock. It is no secret that the French authorities have been preparing measures to keep the police force of their concession up to its present high standard of efficiency through local volunteers, should the calls of the army on active service make serious inroads into their permanent personnel. The report would seem to indicate that certain extremists are trying to follow clumsily the technique of Hitler, creating imaginary dangers to rights which have never previously existed. The French Concession in Shanghai was granted by the Chinese Government to the French people in part return for work done in routing the Taiping rebels who were holding the then native city. It is extremely improbable that any Frenchman would consider for a second the idea of handing over such a concession to a third Power. It should also be realized that the United States has from the first set its face against owning concessions in China. There is still a large section of public opinion in America resolutely opposed to any, embroilment of the United States in Far Eastern affairs, even to the extent of advocating an immediate withdrawal from the Philippine Islands. What chance, therefore, would any administration in Washington have to win the support of the country for any move so complicated as to take over control of a foreign concession without the consent of the government which made the concession? The whole idea is too absurd to be argued further.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.