The fact that the Italians were able to occupy Zeila and Hargeisa so quickly after the opening of their attack on British Somali-merely indicative of the decision of command that the immediate of the colony were not the best adapted, for defence. Consequently, when commenced their advance, the a delaying action, inflicting loss on them, and escaping with It seems as if the British "forces will not seek to contest the Italian in-Y sion,; he high lands around Berbera, some from Zeila; are reached, for it is reported that the terrain there is far more suitable for defensive fighting, and that there the numerically inferior forces of the British, though very superior in other direc-will be able to hold and defeat the Tt has been pointed out that it mot have been sound tactics to have the enemy along the British Somali-border, and it is a good argument that, the war area in Africa, Britain's is occupation of territory, but the enemy's forces which can-reinforced. It, therefore, does "where the ultimate defeat of the OPE soong as it occurs. Obconditions as prevail in Africa the longer the enemy is obmake his lines of communication, the ihe British, who will take their in deciding when to take up the ter-offensive.
In such a war of attrition, as that in land or Libya, for while the British fleet ily controls the Mediterranean, a fact which the Italian Navy has not yet sought to challenge, Italian troops in Libya are practically cut off from their home bases, are just as much left to their own de-those in Ethiopia who cannot receive reinforcements in men and to repair the wastage that fighting ly entail. Hence the war of aap are obliged to fight
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.