The debate in the House of Commons on manpower ended on a cordial note, criticisms of the Government being taken in as good part as the Government's explanations. It was obvious on both sides that the object of ensuring that the skilled labour of Great Britain should be employed to the greatest advantage to the nation's war effort was paramount in the minds of the critics and the Government. How this should be done is a question which bristles with complications. The old days, when it was "Tommy this, and Tommy that, and Tommy where's your gun?", passed long ago. The army of aday is an army of men skilled not only in but in the mechanics of the weapons which skilled men in the factories turn out for them. The men in the services and the men in industries are, in fact, complementary. The best weapon in the world is useless when and cannot repair it when need be. And on the other hand the most courageous man in the world is of little use when he is stuck at the wrong end of an automatic gun which his enemy will not hesitate to use.
Jabour r the skilled man e aaa factory is useful only when it x y a skilled man in the face of the enemy. And the difficulty which those planning: 1 have to determine is the between the two. In a world ments could be made as sim] Hi of the hand, there would be no "When men were needed more in the line than in the factories they transferred to the front; and when-men more urgently needed in the factories, gould be withdrawn from the firing li Things are unfortunately not like that.
The British Army is at present enjoying a comparative fighting lull. But it would be a mistake which every member of it would hasten to correct at once, if it were that it is resting. As Mr. Churchill has gone been pre-than if he is retained in the army? In seeking an answer to this question it is necessary to take the long, not the short, view. Some of the criticism which the Government has had to endure in the press has seemed to suffer from the delusion that a soldier can be made just so efficient and no more. That is to say, when a man has passed through certain tests, he has little to do than to sit idly by until the opportunity arises during which he can show that he has learned the business of being a soldier effectively. This is, of course, very far from being the truth. A' soldier, properly commanded and employed, increases his efficiency steadily. His field of progress ¿s probably wider than that which opens before the industrial worker. In what circumstances, then, would it be wise {o take him from his military environment and return him to his old one? His work in the factory would doubtless be of great value; but would it be great enough to raise the level of general efficiency in this employment—not simply keep it at the same standard? These are important questions which have a bearing on the ultimate one—is the soldier more valuable than the worker in wartime?
The comparative value of the soldier and the worker in wartime turns naturally upon the calls made upon them. The size of a modern army is dependent upon the number of workers who can keep it in the field, and it is thus economically limited. It would appear to follow logically, therefore, that when heavy outside calls are made upon the workers, such as calls to supply arms to Russia, the size t the home army they normally supply should be reduced in proportion with the extra numbers of men they must supply in other lands. But the logical sequence is in this case absurd. What must be adapted is the standard of efficiency of the general supply, and those whose duty it. is to govern the country must see to it that the standard is allowed to decline no more than is absolutely necessary, and that expansion should be pushed to make the decline only temporary. There is naturally room for a great deal of difference of opinion as to how far this efficiency can be allowed to decline without seriously impairing national safety. It may be argüed that other countries, even the Germans, have somewhat similar sacrifices of efficiency to make, when costly offensives call for the urgent replacement of lost or damaged material, and that therefore the decline in efficiency may be considerable without harming the comparative effectiveness of the fighting services. This argument is a dangerous one, yet it seems to be behind much of the agitation for the switch over of men from the fighting to the producing services to meet the greater demands made upon the producers by the extension of the war. But it is to be sincerely hoped that it will not be allowed to influence the judgment of those who take the long view of the war and are working for/a sure and steadily-increasing pressure upon the enemy, consolidated upon a firm foundation wherever progress has been made.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.