The earnest plea made by Brivis PEACE-MAKER for consideration of the possibility of having a preliminary armistice in Shanghai has, as its sponsor probably desired, evoked active discussion. He, possibly, is disappointed that so much energy has been expended in criticizing certain points. of detail which he had thrown into his argument less with the intention of inviting specific examination of them than with the object of emphasizing the importance of taking into account the views of both sides to the present disastrous conflict, Shanghai is not the main arena of the struggle. That is what differentiates these: troubles; from those of 1932, In resistance to Japanese aggression as specially, developed in North China, the Chinese Government has decided to combine support of the forces now trying to stem the Japanese advance to the Yellow River with a strong thrust against Japanese positions in Shanghai. That decision clearly carries for Chinese factors of vital national importance. Consequently, any proposal which appears on the surface to solve Shanghai's difficulties without regard to wider issues is bound to receive tepid attention. Memories too are apt to cite the attempts made in 1932 by Japanese spokesmen to advocate the creation of a demilitarized zone linked up with the establishment of Shanghai as a "free city." Mr. Suemasa Okamoto's recent statement referred' quite frankly to that scheme as a Japanese proposal undeservodly ignored. Although therefore Burrish PEACEMAKER carefully insisted that there should be no prejudice offered to the sovereign rights of China, his mere mention of the proposed "free port" at once attracted suspicion and indignant refusals to consider such a scheme. Unhappily it is impossible to dissociate current designs from past history. To that extent this reception of what was, in fact, a sincerely tendered plea cannot be regarded with surprise. Indeed it accords with comments which this journal itself had ventured to make before the correspondence began. Nevertheless it is essential that, at atime when partisanship runs high, men of goodwill should consider the ultimate and inevitable cessation of strife and in so doing endeavour to discover the happy or golden mean. Whether Barish PEACEMAKEK'S selection of the points on which he desired his mediatory reflections to rest was entirely sound really matters little for, obviously, he laid no dogmatic stress thereon. He was endeavouring to be illustrative in addressing himself to his main theme.
The possible removal of the present fighting from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai does not imply that such an event will automatically set this city free to pick up the threads of its commercial activities, to resume normality without regard to results elsewhere. Shanghai sue more has the courage of its pertinacity. Even now it is manfully making the best of a difficult situation and nailing the flag of "business as usual" to its masthead. That is all to the good. Yet it would be idle to ignore the fact that until normality can be thought of in the interior, until the Government at Nanking and the people behind it have pressed their resistance to its logical conclusion, one way or the other, Shanghai's return to normal will "only be provisional and imperfect. Chinese opinion is naturally sensitive on this point. It feels diffidence in endorsing any proposals which might be interpreted as basing Shanghai's recovery on an indifference to e bigger question of the country's destiny. Foreigners in particular, have to walk warily therefore in making such proposals. The politico-military decision to stand in Shanghai against Japanese aggression probably—and who shall say unfairly?—took into account the possible advantages of associating this city with the general campaign. Foreigners, quite understandably, may feel aggrieved at the idea. They may argue that this is not their war, that they are trading here as part of an international community which has suffered grievously without any possibility of retaliating and that it is only just'therefore that they should be allowed to national character of the struggle. have to acquiesce in the view that Shanghai must suffer with the rest of China, however much their own material commitments may lose thereby. They are the more moved to $s2 this negative attitude because they cannot just now perceive any basis on which either Japan or China can be persuaded to discuss peace or on which the Chinese Government may sound like a suggestion that the Chinese Government welcomes a situation which makes Shanghai the bedfellow of the Eri rest of China in adversity, There is no call to go as far as that. It might be sufficient to maintain that, deriving as it does -its prosperity from the welfare of the interior, Shanghai cannot unfairly be expected to share in the efforts which are now being made to resist a catastrophic attack on that source of its wealth and security.
In thus searching for the happy mean it has been necessary to put the two points of view in sharp contrast. Neither is indicative of that line of thought which might assist in providing an acceptable solution. The creation of a demilitarized zone has already been proposed by certain foreign powers with the Object of ending Shanghai's immediate dangers, Its relection did not come from the Chinese Government. If such a scheme were now proposed and dependent on Japanese approval the Chinese Government would be emphatic in condemning it as suspect and impossible to entertain for a moment. Yet neither Chinese nor foreign opinion can be happy in contemplating the prospect of involving Shanghai for a prolonged period in the vicissitudes of the present struggle without any effort to mitigate the consequent economic and political losses. Legitimately may Chinese opinion expect Shanghai to share in China's woes according to its capacity. Stretched beyond that point, there is a real danger of Shanghai becoming the nose which is cut off to spite an otherwise attractive countenance. More practically may it be urged that if the Government wished to capitalize the international character of Shanghai, it could serve its own purposes and at the same time minister to humanitarian demands by recognizing the importance of those commercial assets which the restoration of the current of Shanghai's trade would produce. However the struggle in the field may proceed will it be said that China is any better off if at the -end of it Shanghai lies a stagnant, deserted pool, its waters poisoned, without the power to revive a parched community? in return for the benefits which it receives from the country of which it is a part, has not been negligent in developing industrial and financial institutions of great value, Statesmanship would not lightly abandon the advantages to be derived therefrom. Without therefore in any way yielding toa tame spirit of acquiescence in the aggression against which China is rightly and stoutly fighting, it should be possible to find the happy mean in considering Shanghai's pre-dicement. Let there be no suggestion that it should be wrapped up in some magical insulator to cut its sympathies off from those of China as a whole. Rather let there be devised some plan whereby it may be encouraged to recover needed vitality so that it may more effectively minister to the economic needs of a country desperately fighting for existence.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.