As an example, they cited the widest speculation on whether the hypothetical success of the German blitzkrieg would help or hurt President Roosevelt's prospects. One faction of diplomatic observers contended that should England be de-teated, the United States' concern for Gefence would be so overwhelming as to assure the President's retention for the continuity of the vast pre-poredness programmes.
Other factions argued.that that the defeat England of would reveal Germany's strength t whelming, and United defenses [us so over-so incomplete, as to. ngčessitate caution regarding a canvas GP United States attitudes and policies. This group believed that in such an event considerable sentiment might incline towards a new personality in the White House.
Many disinterested observers thought that the decisive number of voters—perhaps one quartet to one third—wfll reserve judgement until the last days of the campaign, and reach a decision based largely on their estimates of the respective administrative capacities of President Roosevelt and Mr. Wilkie for dealing with the preparedness programme and other urgent national problems.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.