The period of Japanese acquiescence during the ten years from the Washington treaties to the Manchu-tien invasion of 1931 had been merely an expedient temporization of a destiny, bequeathed of the gods, to be the supreme power in Asia and int the Western Pacific. The "positiveness" of a Baron Tanaka and not tke acquiescent passivity of a Shide-hora was truly representative of her foreign policy in China. The status quo of Anglo-American naval egualif not detdal dominance, in the Western Pacific and along the freeboard of China. which Japan conceded in the Washington treaties did not represent the true spirit of ent. The fact was that China at that lime could have asked and received of America and Britain all that her own energies and capacities could entitle her to, even to the speedy abolition of the ancient mark of foreign superiority—fundamental to the foreign status in China—known as extraterritoriality. Not foreign in-transigence but China's own incapacities alone stayed the pace—and Japan!
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.