Mr. Suesama Okamoto has taken pains elaborately to prove what few people will endeavour to deny: that the Chinese Government, faced in the North by unwary ranted aggression from Japan, decided that the politico-military needs of the situation demanded the combination of resistance in the North with a strong attack on Japanese forces in the Shanghai area. Mr. Okamoto's statement may also be cordially endorsed in its contention that he, as representing the Japanese Government here, did his best in the few weeks leading up to the outbreak fo keep Shanghai clear of hostilities. He was Supported by a marked mitigation in the agperity of the Japanese Landing Party's Occasions. He was assisted by ce-operation from the City. Government of Shanghai so far as that administration could control local events. Unfortunately, in endeavouring to throw on Chinese shoulders all the blame for the gradual increase in local tension and for breaches of the Peace Agreement of 1932, he entirely overlooks the progressive measures which the Japanese Naval garrison took from 1932 onwards to usurp the authority of the Shanghai Municipal Council in the Settlement, to flaunt the preparedness of the armed might of that garrison, to convert Hongkew and Yangtszepoo into what became incréas-ingly a Japanese enclave and therefore a clear menace to the security for which the Peace Preservation Corps, with Japanese approval, was originally intended to provide. No-one who recalls the various local "jncidents"—some of them more accurately described as "mare's nests"—which incessantly demanded the alertness of high officials of the Municipal Council to an extent altogether beyond their intrinsic significance can be blind to an aspect of the situation which, not unnaturally, cannot be taken into account by Mr. Okamoto but which is vital to a fair appreciation of the issues involved. The nice adjustment of responsibility for breaches of the Peace Agreement cannot be satisfactorily achieved without consideration of those points and particularly of the Chinese argument that the proceedings of the Joint Commission on which Mr, Okamoto so firmly relies were, by circumstances not entirely within Japanese control, transformed into machinery less for supervising the observance of the agreement by both sides than for registering Japanese protests.
Mr. Okamoto graphically reveals the extent to which he went in relying on the efficacy of his ce-operation for preserving the peace of Shanghai. His bona fides in that matter cannot be disputed. He took risks which might have seriously prejudiced his own position with his Government and evidently the rapid concentration of the Chinese forces in vastly superior numbers severely tested the comparatively small garrison at the disposal of the Japanese Naval Commander. No doubt the reinforcement and military armament of the Chinese Preservation Corps could be regarded as a technical breach of the Peace Agreement, but in the light of the constant pressure exerted by Japanese militarism on the Government at Nanking and the reflection of that pressure by Japanese activities in the Settlement, it is not unreasonable to argue that the conditions in which the Peace Agreement was signed had been radically changed. China, in fact, whether in Shanghai, East Hopei or Peiping, had been put in the position of the little animal who, liable to attack, was so naughty as to prepare to defend itself. Mr. Okamoto's personal conscience is justifiably so clear in this matter that he may be forgiven his apparent lack of perception that the course of events in China since September 1931 should impel a Japanese spokesman to tread more delicately even than Agag in dilating on the subject of breaches of agreement. So allegations that the Chinese authorities have been concerned to strengthen their defences are apt to leave the critic cold, as he ponders over the extra-vacant claims of Japan's military and naval representatives here and in the North to order the goings of the people of this country and to develop an ever-increasing control over Chinese territory. Such encroachment which, despite the welcome but abortive evolution and: of the "new concept" of China in Tokyo, never paused in its stride, could not but drive its victim ta the desperation of resistance. That fundamental fact is not of in Mr. Okamoto's study of the local situation here.
With Mr. Okamoto's suggestion that the Powers were remiss in failing to summon a round table conference to discuss the future status of Shanghai there may be some measure of agreement, but it must be confessed that, apart from their world-preoccupations, the Powers could not have felt that opportunity for such a discussion was facilitated by the aggressive trend of Japan's $51 Policy. Just as they were opposed to. consideration of the scheme for a demilitarized zone because it definitely took shape under the shadow of the attack on Shanghai in 1932, so they could not expect practical results from discussions which were bound to raise the whole question of Japanese intentions as betokened by. the uninterrupted march of events in the North. Perhaps it would have been better for Shanghai had they faced those difficulties, but he would be a bold man who would aver that such action would have borne fruit, especially in view of the chequered story of the International Settlement's own efforts to secure Japanese ce-operation in solving problems of the outside roads ana the inspection of factories. Mr. Okamoto plaintively describes his own country as a bad propagandist. No-one will quarrel with {he description, for nothing could be so damaging to the case which he painstakingly seeks to establish than Japan's own actions in China during the last six years. Nor does he do himself justice when he ventures to go beyond. Shanghai and launch an attack on the personnel of the Government at Nanking. Even if it be conceded that his picturesque charges are justified—a view which this journal must not be taken to endorse—it may- pertinently be asked whether on that account a friendly neighbour desirous of cultivating the "closest relations with the Chinese people" is entitled to descend in overwhelming force on that people's shores and spread death and destruction in assertion of the altruistic desire to change its leaders. Logic moreover is not Mr. Okamoto's strong point, for he attributes the main responsibility for the sins of the Chinese Government to the lack of "political or national consciousness among the Chinese masses." So it is not surprising that the armed forces now operating in China at Japan's bidding are not able notably to distinguish between those whom Mr. Okamoto describes as enemies and those whom he clasps to his bosom as friends. It is unnecessary perhaps to recall that the attempt by Tokyo—repeated by Mr. Okamoto—to draw a parallel between the present situation and that of 1927 when the British Defence Force came to Shanghai has been devastatingly exposed in London. Mr. Okamoto's catholic taste in perusing the foreign press has apparently not led him to that discovery. The concluding passages of his statement show an abandonment.of the earlier effort to be objective. Breathless incoherence marks its criticisms of world opinion as of the Chinese Government. That sure sign of a bad case evokes sympathy for a diplomat gallantly struggling with adversity. It does not detract from the accuracy of his assessment of the propaganda to which it thus makes contribution.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.