Sept. 26.
'The absence of further developments in Soviet-German relations, singe the commence. ment of the march into Poland, and the division of that country. between' the two, leaves the governments. of the rest of the world, and particularly. Great Britain and France, still wondering exactly what 'Stalin contemplates doing next, His reaffirma. tions of neutrality.in. the' struggle be. tween the Allies, and Germany may be quite sincere, providing all he had in mind was the restoration to Russia of that part of Poland, which, for some time prior to. the Great War, indeed since the partition about} 150 years ago, had belonged to her. There has "already transpired suflcient to prove that there was more behind the anti-aggression pact than first met the eye when it wes announced, and what is puzzling the chan-colletics of Europe is whether or not there still something more behind the agreement to divide Poland. The question is naturally asked as to what Herr Hitler expected (0 receive stil further in exchange for the high price he has given for M, Stalin's help in Guleldy subduing Poland, Of the ideological enmity between the two countries there all the evidence in the world, and what naturally puzzling many people is the bast upon which this enmity has for the moment been thrust into abeyance, and what Stalin hopes still further to get. out of ths strangest international bargain. that history has seen for a very long time, The policies of Russia have for the most part been pacify, and in this connection the Soviet-Manchow kuo border disputes have not been overlooked, for they have never been allowed to attain uncontrollable dimensions, and have, the case of Nomonhan, finally ended by a truce and a negotiation of boundaries, That acificism is not only one of considered doctrine in international affairs but something dictated by the internal needs. of Bolshevik Russia itself, One of the dravbacks of engaging in war, from the point of view of the civilian government of Russia, lies in the fact that once the country was committed to major hostilities the policies of the Kremlin would have to be subordinated to the prosecution of the war, with the grave possibility of the military command eventually emerging from the struggle in. complet command of the Government, That danger is one which has always bes the minds of the Kremlin, and toa. ver) large extent accounts for the removal of high coffers who Ju the course of time have established themselves in the confidence. of their men, \ddie, and though the latter have been repeatedly purged, there is as yet nothing to indicate that the Army would hesitate in reinforcing their grip on the Government of the country which substantial hostilities would give them at least until the conclusion of the outbreak of war. In this to be found the reason for the assurance by the Kremlin to the various interested nations of the maintenance of her neutrality, which, while in view of recent events may bbe considered not to amount to much, may, Decause of the realities of the situation be rather more sincere than appears at first blush, The German determination never have to fight a European war on two fronts has much reason to commend it. Since the last war it has become an obsession. Never theless so long as he was convinced that he could obtain from the democracies what he wanted without-Aghting Herr Hitler would have none of the Bolshevik, The name was anathema to him, and his sudden reversal of form must have come as a very consider able surprise to those who rendered him unquestioning loyalty. Once it was borne in upon him that the Ailies would fight, in the circumstances which he contemplated bringing about, Herr Hitler had to obtain a friend has in eastern Europe, and he has succeeded in obtaining M. Stalin for the moment and at a price. The price amounts to the concession of paramountcy in south-eastern Europe and a greater Russian influence in the Bal Kans than Russia has had for a long time ast. That may be all for the moment which the Kremlin desires, but if it does, as it may, defeat the German policy of Drang nach Sudosten that, if only temporary, may prove the future'a very high price to pay for the present momentary advantage, Herr Hitler may yet find himself in a position where he would be forced to fight to rehhabilitate his standing in that part of the world, If, and when the western campaign is brought to a conclusion with the defeat of Germany, as may without undue optimism bbe confidently expected, hen position will be that she will still be within an encirclement half of which will be of her own creation, namely that on her eastern border. Should she emerge from the struggle victorious, it is conceivable that another war would necessary to restore what she has abandoned in the east and south-east, and. it may be that Herr Hitler's tortuous scheme of utilize ing temporary makeshifts, as unreal in their (Continued on page 527, col. 3)
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.