To the Editor of the "Nortu-Cuina Dary News"
Sin,—As one who always reads your leading articles wiry interest and advantage, I feel som® diffidence in venturing to express disagreement with; the views put forward editorially'this (Wednesday) morning, on the Sino-Japanese crisis. The last thing that I would wish to do would be to distort your meaning, and if I have unwittingly done so no doubt you will correct. me.
You say: sion may. be resented it can hardy be However bitterly Japanese ageres-denied that its extension would be Chcouraged rather than stayed by physical resistance from the Central Government and would be accompanied by such complete destruction China's resources that all hopes of national reconstruction might have to be indefinitely postponed. The ills of compliance with Japanese demands may be great and disconcerting, They Would not be mitigated by resistance "indeed they might well be enhanced The last state of China might then be worse than the first, I interpret that to mean that you advise-China to tolerate and condone Japanese aggression, whatever resentment it may cause, because worse things might happen. The Japanese have openly stated that they intend to put Hopei and Charhar under a regime similar to that in East Hopei, that is independent of Nanking. Apparently you counsel China to agree to this, The head of the Executive Yuan, a position in China equivalent to that of the Prime Minister in Great Britain, has enunciated four minimum requirements by China which render acceptance of such a proposal impossible without almost inevitably causing civil dissension which would damage the Tountry infinitely more than war with Japan. The Generalissimo is advised, in effect, to admit openly that he spoke as a politician, not as a statesman, Assume for a moment that China did agree to the severance of the two more provinces from her jurisdic tion—and present Japan with the full right to exploit the iron and coal resources, build strategic railways qnd eventually persuade the puppet administration to recognize "Manchoukuo." Would this be the end any more than Manchuria and Jehol were the end? The past is not an infallible guide to the future, but the assumption is fair that, before long, Shantung and Fukien, provinces in which Jupan possesses important interests, would suddenly develop a "spontaneous" demand for "autonomy"—under Japan's benign guidance. Then China—much weakened by the loss of Charhar and Hopei—would be counselled to let Shantung and Fuki go, however resentful she might feel, jest a worse thing befall her. And so on ad infinitum, or rather while anything of China remained.
There sre great differences between Belgium and China, but it is not impertinent to ask what would be the advice to Belgium if, under an implied threat of war, a more militarily powerful neighbour demanded that she should—surrender sovereignty over a portion heavy expenditure of lives mon not, be it noted, anything more serian: that quite an accurate appraisement of the respective consequences of war? I venture 10 suggest that it is not. China is in no danger of the "complete destruction of her resources." This is an agricul tural country. This loss of her entire aboard and foreign trade, except across her land frontiers, course, met heavy loss. truction of Nanking and other bites wouldvalso mean loss. But her sources would remain on and in the What about Japan? Foreign trade is her life-blood and China is one of her best: markets. If China only managed to hold out as long as Abys-sinza did—eight months—the economic consequences to a country like Japan, whose finances are in a thoroughly disorganized condition, would not be simply serious but disastrous, Japan's trade with Chins would practically cease. She would have to turn much of her industrial machinery to war purposes and so will lose foreign markets. She would be spending much' more and receiving much less.
A war would, of course, cause loss to British interests, but not nearly so complete and final a loss as the domination of China by Japan. The British, interests in North China are extensive. There is also much British capital invested in loans secured on Customs revenues. When Japan wrested Manchuria. from China she promised to pay, Manchuria's quota to the service of foreign loans. Of course the promise was not kept Most certainly, if Hopei and Charhar ure allowed to pass under a Japanese controlled regime, as Japan demands that they must, the Customs revenue ct Tientsin will be lost. Later those of Chefoo and Tsingtao would follow This would hardly be to the interest of British bondholders. If British financial and commercial interests took a longer view, they would rea liza that, if China is forced into war she will Ue battling on their behalf as_well as her own.
Personally I do not believe that China will accept advice to forego her sovereign rights in Nofth China, sights, by the way, which the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty are morally obliged to respect.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.