With the departure of Major General Akira Muto, staff officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Force to North China, and his comrades from Tokyo for Tientsin, that officer has fulfilled his threat to walk out of the Tokyo conference for a settlement of the Tientsin issue, His departure need not, necessarily indicate that the negotiations have already broken down, thought that possibility cannot be disregarded now any more than it could at any time since the eonversations began. It does give rise however to the question as to exactly what amount of good it can be hoped to serve by continuing these talks, for it has been made quite plain by Maj-General Muto's action that, unless the settlement reached at Tokyo is wholly in accordance' with the dictated demands of the Army, it will never be implemented by them. Thus, while the Tokyo. negotiations have been reduced to their proper status conversations between two governments, instead of between one government and. another government and its army, no brighter prospects of a final settlement of the Tientsin Issue exist, There is no guarantee that the Japanese army will loyally abide by whatever settlement is reached by the Tokyo Government and, if earlier eumicions 28 the probabilities of success existed, a Snaaubtediy did, the action of the Tlentin military' representatives can merely serve to confirm them. What the military command in North' China apparently fear is a breakdown of the negotiations in the presence of their representatives, and the withdrawal of Maj.-General Muto is as much for the purpose of "saving face" in the event of sucha development as it may be for the purpose of wrecking conversations Jin which up to the present they have of sueceeded in obtaining their own way with the rapidity which they desired, They have found the British nut somewhat dificult to crack, and are going to stand by, and watch failure for which they will in any event bbe responsible, If there is a failure it will be entirely duc to the attitude of the Japanese northern command. Originally they raised purely local issue centred around. the demand for the rendition of the four men alleged tobe concerned in the murder of the Chinese Superintendent of Customs.
When they found that even this point was not 50 capable of settlement as they hoped the formulation of a demand would maize it, the putting forward of further requirements tended to transform a simple issue into a number of points ultimately involving amongst others, not only the silver in the various banks' inthe British and French Conces: sions in Tientsin, but also of Great Britain's general policy towards the Chinese National Government. To account for the failure of the Japanese Army to bring its adventure {info China to an early and successful conclusion, it was necessary to discover some arch enemy, whose help it was that was enabling the Chinese to carry out so determined a resistance. Great Britain was eing-Jed out, despite the fact that, whatever she has done with regard to assisting China was well within the accepted definition of neutr ity, and was precisely what was being done by' Japan's. anti-Comintern "friends, more particularly Germany, and other third party neutrals such as France and the United States. It is obvious that if the Japanese Government under the pressure of the Japanese Army could force Great Britain completely to re-orient her policy in the Far East, something to compensate Japan for the failure of its Army to bring its adventure to a quick and profitable conclusion would Ihave been produced, while if that could not be brought about, at least some sort of excuse, no matter how specious it may prove to be, would be forthcoming for what. the Japanese army has up to the present failed to" secure, namely the defeat of China. While that sort of thing may serve for domestic consumption in Japan, it will not deceive the rest of the world." Great Britain. in common with practically every other third party neutral Power has been rendering such services to China as she may very well expect from neutrals, Indeed, as it has been 80 often pointed out, that same neutrality makes it possible for some of the Powers 10 supply munitions and war supplies to Japan to such an extent that without them it is doubtful whether she would have been able to carry on s0 long as she has.
What the Japanese Army failed to understand when entering into the Tokyo conversations—and what most probably the Tokyo Government fully appreciated,—was that hopes of coercing Great Britain into am abject surrender were faint in the extreme. The former failed to realize the significance of Mr. Chamberlain's statement when he said that Britain would change its foreign policy at the dictate of no nation, and it was with that dominant idea in its mind that it entered into conversations with the Japanese Government and its military. The pressure which the Japanese have sought to bring to bear in this matter has been superflelally imposing. In addition to demonstrations in Japan itself, a carefully concerted scheme, un~ doubledly inspired and controlled by the Japanese for the fanning of anti-British hatred throughout China was set afoot, There (Continued on page 267, Col. 2)
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.