In view of the forthcoming conference of the Scandinavian countries, with the exception this time of Finland, at Copenhagen, commencing on February 24, the statement last week concerning Sweden's intention to remain neutral in the Finnish-Russian war, and the proclamation of King Gustaf refusing military aid for the Finns, assume very considerable importance. King Gustaf states most emphatically that from the very first he told the Finnish Government that it would be impossible for Sweden openly to participate in military intervention on behalf of Finland, and while he was ready to give a maximum of aid to Finland, he felt sure that military intervention would involve his own country not only in war with Russia but possibly with other Powers. It speaks volumes for the courage of the Finns that, being well aware of the Swedish attitude, they, nevertheless, decided to oppose firm resistance to the Russian aggression. It is well within the competence of the Swedish Government to decide exactly what shall be its attitude towards the Russo-Finnish hostilities, and, if it has decided that it will keep out of trouble at all costs, that is purely a matter of its own concern. Whether it is wise in view of all that has transpired, is entirely another matter. If there is complete certainty that neither Germany nor Russia have any designs upon the integrity of the Scandinavian countries then the wisdom of the decision cannot be doubted, for no country desires to stir up trouble if it can possibly be avoided. But it is significant to note that one of the original demands made upon Finland was for the cession of territory in the north which would have given the Soviet a common frontier with Norway and Sweden, which does not at the present exist, and the very obvious wish of Moscow to remove the Finnish buffer between itself and Norway and Sweden, can only, in view of all that has happened, be regarded as most sinister. Both Norway and Sweden are faced with a situation now, which is entirely new, and it remains to be seen whether they will be able to remain at peace under the terrific pressure which is being put upon them.
Their safety in the past undoubtedly depended upon a state of enmity existing between Germany and Russia. That no longer exists. In its place there has been created a predatory union in which both parties are out to grab everything they can, and for whom the rich natural resources of Scandinavia, and especially Sweden have an overwhelming allure. The surrender of Germany's traditional policy in the Baltic of August last meant the dropping of the old resolution to prevent Russia obtaining access to the Atlaptic. For that purpose the Reich maintained advanced positions in the Baltic, which have now been wholly given up. Russian victory over Finland would give her the complete control of the northern Baltic, and at the same time threaten the German position in the south, while, with the elimination of the Finns, Russia would be brought right up to the Swedish and Norwegian borders, constituting a threat the seriousness of which cannot now be minimized. The position of both Norway and Sweden is consequently most critical, and both those nations face a crisis probably unparalleled in their history, and one which may very well result in their ultimate destruction. The claim has been advanced, with some apparent justification that Sweden's attitude of passive neutrality, and Norway's policy of favouring Ge-many by permitting her shipping to use Norwegian territorial waters, is all part of the general scheme to secure safety by playing Germany off against Russia. It may succeed so long as there is that distrust between Berlin and Moscow which was evidenced by the manner in which Russia advanced into Poland to seize its share of the agreed upon spoils without waiting for Herr Hitler to keep his part of the bargain of August 23 last, but at any rate for the time being there is an identity of purpose between the two countries which makes the menace to Scandinavia all the more serious. There is only one chance of Germany and Russia disagreeing with regard to the Scandinavian countries. If the Reich had any reason to fear that Russian domination might prevent it receiving the large supplies of iron ore which it at present obtains from Sweden, there can be little doubt that Germany would take action to restrain the Russians.
The cutting off of that source of supply of so essential a war material would mean a serious thing for Germany, and it may safely be said that German and Russian interest in Swedish natural riches is not identical but completely in opposition. On the other hand the Reich may still desire to avoid fighting on any other front than the western. It was that which led Herr Hitler to forswear his acknowledged policies, and he may still prefer to see Russia go ahead on the Scandinavian peninsula rather than divert forces there to resist Russian encroachment. But whether that occurs or not the condition of the Scandinavian countries will still be parlous. They have no guarantee that sooner or later they will not fall into the greedy maw of one or the other of the aggressor nations. Indeed they have a certainty, unless they can agree upon some common form of defence which would unite them against all aggression. That, however, will prove ineffective if it does not include Finland, and they cannot include her unless they are prepared to go to her assistance se with active military intervention which would prevent the Russians from ever reaching moir frontiers. Germany it is reported has stated that she would regard Scandinavian intervention in behalf of Finland as a areach of neutrality, but both the Norwegian and Swedish Governments have to consider what is to be their ultimate fate if Finland 52 ıs first to go, and then they themselves picked off piecemeal as it suits the convenience of the aggressor states. United, they stand a chance of successfully defending themselves, divided, they run the risk of meeting that sate which the Finns are so manfully juggling to avoid, and which they may escape if sufficient assistance in men and material is afforded them. The Finns are sighting the battle of every Scandinavian. mey are the outposts of the defence of both Norway, and Sweden, and in the maintenance of present neutrality they are in fact assisting both Germany and Russia towards their own elimination, The desire to keep out of war is perfectly comprehensible, and neither Norway nor Sweden are to be blamed. for having such a wish, but the real question is whether they are strong enough to snaintain their neutrality, and that is some-ching about which there must be great doubt.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.