Count Ciano's visit to Berlin, at the request of Herr Hitler, will be watched with the closest attention, for, obviously, Der Féehrer is making another attempt to secure the unconditional support of Italy for his future policies. It remains to be seen whether the official overtures for peace will be made through the intermediation of the Italian Government, though the fact that its Foreign Minister has gone to Berlin seems to suggest that this may be the case. As matters stand Italy seems to be the only country whose Government could with propriety undertake the task of communicating the German peace proposals to the Allies, for if the argument holds good that by doing so she was recognizing the conquest of Poland, it may be pointed out that there would be nothing incongruous in Italy doing so. There is very little to suggest that Italy will, at any rate for the time being, abandon that neutrality upon which she decided at the outbreak of war. Obviously her best interests are served by keeping as completely out of the struggle as possible, while it is unlikely that Germany will seek to press her to come into the war on her side, for by doing so much of the value of the Siegfried line would vanish. Obviously with a hostile Italy, an opening would be given the Allies to invade Italy, and force her, and Germany to fight it out on the plains of northern Lombardy, and that is something which the Germans do not at present care to envisage. The Reich is undoubtedly aware that, whatever may be the relations between itself, and the Italian Government, there is no burning affection between the Italian people and the German, in addition to which there has been demonstrated no enthusiasm for this war by the Italians, who very clearly wish to keep out of trouble if at all possible. This view seems to be supported by the opinions of political quarters in Rome, which consider that, in the face of the probable reject tion of its peace proposals, the Reich will wish to obtain from Italy a definition of neutrality as favourable to its interests as possible. How far Rome will be able to meet Berlin's wishes in this matter remains to be seen, but it has to be borne in mind that Signor Mussolini was always against Herr' Hitler plunging Europe into war over the question of Danzig and Poland, and will in all probability feel no greater enthusiasm now that the struggle has been precipitated. Seen from a realistic point of view it is quite clear that whatever Germany has to offer Italy can only be dependent upon a victory for the Axis. Signor Mussolini might very well be a little sceptical about any such promises dependent upon Herr Hitler's wild gamble. The scene has very greatly changed from the days when Herr Hitler absolved Italy of the obligation to fight on his side, and he is now shopping round for all the assistance he can get in the light of the seriousness of his position. He is likely to promise anything, but added to his well known reluctance to honour his obligations must be the fact that he has not yet won the war, and, unless something very unforeseen occurs, is very unlikely to do so. The logical view is that Herr Hitler has very little to offer to Italy. There is no Poland between them to be divided. Axis influence in the Balkans has been seriously impaired by Herr Hitler's surrender to M. Stalin, and all the diplomatic considerations with which he is at present equipped are merely promissory notes the satisfaction of which is entirely dependent upon a hazardous contingency, and, of course, Herr Hitler's readiness ultimately to honour his commitments.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.